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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
by
Alicia Uribe
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2014
James F. Spriggs II, Chair
ABSTRACT
This dissertation project considers judicial appointments in a new light. The project,
first, considers how appointments to the United States Federal Judiciary might be thought
of differently if the appointment to multiple positions were thought of as interdependent
decisions rather than independent decisions. I create a simulation based model that matches
judges with vacant positions in the judiciary to see how our expectations of appointments
should differ for different levels of the judiciary and in different political environments. I
then consider how this approach might translate to other selection mechanisms comparing
the selection system for the federal judiciary with other systems that are commonly used
in the American states. I compare and contrast the results of these models to discuss how
selection mechanism dictates the types of judges that are selected. Finally, I apply empirical
tests to the testable predictions from the model of the United States Federal Judiciary,
finding support for a number of the hypotheses that result from this approach.
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
There can be little doubt that judicial selection processes matter. Politicians and scholars
alike have an interest in the manner by which judges are selected (Brace and Hall, 1997; Brace
and Boyea, 2008; Caldarone, Canes-Wrone and Clark, 2009; Canes-Wrone, Clark and Kelly,
2014; Gordon and Huber, 2007; Hall and Bonneau, 2008; Huber and Gordon, 2004; Nelson,
Caufield and Martin, 2013; O’Connor, 2010; Rehnquist, 2002). This interest exists for judges
selected to all courts in both the state and federal judiciaries. There are a number of aspects
of selection that are of interest. First, scholars have examined who is selected to these courts,
especially as certain elements of the political environment change (Choi and Gulati, 2004;
Clark, 2003; Danelski, 1964; Goldman, 1999; Krehbiel, 2007; Moraski and Shipan, 1999;
Rohde and Shepsle, 2007; Slotnick, 2003). Second, scholars have examined components
of individual selection processes (see, e.g., Binder and Maltzman, 2004; Epstein and Segal,
2005; Goldman, 1999; Martinek, Kemper, and Van Winkle, 2002; Moraski and Shipan, 1999;
Segal, 1987). Third, scholars have investigated how selection or retention mechanisms dictate
judges’ behavior once they are on the court (Besley and Payne, 2013; Brace and Boyea,
2008; Canes-Wrone, Clark and Kelly, 2014; Cann and Wilhelm, 2011; Choi, Gulati and
Posner, 2011). In addition to research analyzing individual selection mechanisms, scholars
are interested in the comparison of selection mechanisms, particularly how these mechanisms
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lead to differences in the quality of judges (O’Connor, 2010) and the relationship between
the court and the public (Brace and Hall, 1997; Brace and Boyea, 2008; Huber and Gordon,
2004).
In this dissertation project, I delve into the topic of judicial selection. In Chapter 2, I
create a model that rethinks how judicial appointments are made. In Chapter 3, I adapt
this model to match different selection processes in the United States, to see how the judges
selected under different mechanisms differ. In Chapter 4, I test the testable predictions from
the model created in Chapter 2.
Scholars have treated appointments to the United States Federal Judiciary as isolated
events. In doing so, scholars have essentially assumed that each appointment decision is
made independently. In Chapter 2, I create a model that instead thinks of these decisions as
interdependent, or that each appointment decision affects the other decisions that are made.
To do this, I conceptualize the question of judicial appointments to the United States Federal
Judiciary as a portfolio problem, where the president must choose how to fill all vacancies in
the judiciary, and the decisions that he makes are interdependent because the judges must
be selected from a finite group of individuals. As a result, when the president decides to
appoint a judge to one position, the judge cannot be appointed to any other position. To
determine this portfolio, I create a simulation based model that matches judges with vacant
positions in the judiciary. This model predicts not only who is selected, but also which
positions remain vacant, making this the first model to predict presidential behavior at more
than one stage of the selection process (time to nomination and who is selected).
In Chapter 3, I adapt this model to accomodate four additional selection mechanisms:
single appointer, voting body, elections, and random assignment. The first three represent
selection mechanisms that are currently utilized in the American states, while the fourth
mechanism is used as a baseline to see how structured selection mechanisms dictate who is
selected. In this chapter, I compare the results of these four mechanisms with the results in
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Chapter 2, highlighting the tradeoffs that are inherent in the selection mechanisms utilized
to select judges.
In Chapter 4, I empirically test to the testable predictions from Chapter 2. The model
in Chapter 1 yields a number of predictions about the ideology and qualifications of the
judges that are selected, the number of vacancies that are left open in the judiciary, and the
number of vacancies that are filled by promoting judges within the judiciary as opposed to
selecting new judges. In Chapter 4, I test the model’s predictions about vacancy rates and
promotion rates. The results of these empirical tests are, for the most part, consistent with
the predictions from the model.
This dissertation project rethinks vital aspects of the appointment process, including the
manner by which judges are selected. This project also compares how judges selected under
different mechanisms differ from one another. Finally, this project empirically tests some of
the model’s predictions finding preliminary support for the model.
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Chapter 2
Model of Federal Judicial
Appointments
Because in the long run, the federal judges the president chooses may be his most
profound legacy. ... [J]udges remain. - Bob Dole, 1996
In a 1996 speech, then presidential hopeful, Bob Dole, best stated the importance of
judicial appointments. While presidents do many important things while in office such as
declare and end wars and sign major pieces of legislation into law, few things have as profound
an impact as the changes he makes to the United States Federal Judiciary. Courts produce
policy through their decisions and as a result, the individuals who serve in the judiciary
affect how law develops. The changes that the president makes to the judiciary through
his appointments can have a large effect on how decisions are made. Judicial appointments
are also one of the longest lasting legacies that presidents leave behind because the judges
they appoint will serve in the judiciary and continue to impact judicial policy long past the
president’s tenure in office. There can be little doubt that judicial appointments matter to
presidents.
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Because of the importance of judicial appointments, a rich literature has developed that
examines various aspects of the appointment process (see, e.g., Binder and Maltzman 2004;
Epstein and Segal 2005; Goldman 1999; Martinek, Kemper, and Van Winkle 2002; Moraski
and Shipan 1999; Segal 1987). Yet, no work has looked at the portfolio of appointments
that the president makes to fill vacancies within the judiciary. Instead, the literature to
date has inherently assumed that appointments to the judiciary are independent. Scholars
have focused on appointments to each level of the judiciary separately and treated each
appointment opportunity as an isolated event without considering how other vacancies that
are open at the same time can affect the president’s behavior.
Traditional models of selection leave many questions about the process unanswered.
These models consider individual vacancies and assume that the president will fill each
vacant position, even if he is constrained by the Senate and cannot improve the location
of the court (Choi and Gulati, 2004; Krehbiel, 2007; Moraski and Shipan, 1999; Rohde and
Shepsle, 2007). However, vacancies often build up within the judiciary, with the president
not addressing the vacant positions. Given the importance of judicial appointments, it is
unclear why this type of behavior should ever occur. If, as the quote at the beginning of
this chapter suggests, judicial appointments are the most profound legacy that a president
can leave behind, why would he ever leave judicial positions vacant? This type of behavior
makes little sense if considering appointments independently. However, when considering
appointments as a portfolio decision where the president must fill multiple vacancies from a
finite talent pool, the prevalence of vacant positions becomes more understandable.
In this chapter, I develop a model that considers the portfolio of appointments the pres-
ident chooses to fill vacant positions within the United States Federal Judiciary. This is a
model of presidential decision making under constraint. This approach differs from more
traditional models of selection in a number of ways. First, the model incorporates both
judicial ideology and qualifications. Second, there exists a finite pool of potential judges to
5
fill all vacant positions within the judiciary.1 Third, the president makes decisions about
how to fill all positions within the judiciary concurrently.
The model predicts a portfolio of judicial appointments. These predictions include not
only who is selected, but also who is not selected, or, which positions remain vacant. As a
result, this is the first model of the appointment process that is able to predict behavior at
multiple stages of the process (delay in selection of nominees as well as the actual nominees
selected).
The results from the model suggest that changes in a few key parameters dictate a num-
ber of the president’s decisions. These parameters include the president’s ideological position
relative to the Senate, or, the constraint the president faces from the Senate; the composition
of the judiciary; the size and composition of the talent pool (including the qualifications and
ideologies of members in the talent pool); and the number of vacant positions within the
judiciary. As these key parameters change, the ideology and qualifications of the judges se-
lected, the types of judges selected (whether judges are promoted or selected to the judiciary
for the first time), and the number of positions that remain vacant also change.
In this chapter, I develop a theoretical model that matches judges to vacant positions.
In the next section, I review the literature on judicial appointments, I then set up and
describe the model, discuss the results of the model, and conclude with thoughts about
future extensions.
Judicial Appointments
This chapter contributes to a widely understudied aspect of judicial appointments: se-
lection. As noted previously, countless scholarly projects have focused on judicial appoint-
ments, however, most focus on easily quantifiable aspects of the appointment process, such
as confirmation votes (Epstein and Segal, 2005; Epstein et al., 2006; Martinek, Kemper and
1Or, for vacant positions at higher levels, the president can promote from within the judiciary.
6
Van Winkle, 2002; Segal, 1987; Segal, Cameron and Cover, 1992) and delay in confirmation
votes (Epstein and Segal, 2005; Jo, 2011; Shipan and Shannon, 2003). Far fewer projects
focus on the selection stage itself (Abraham, 2008; Epstein and Segal, 2005; Goldman, 1999;
Moraski and Shipan, 1999; Nemacheck, 2008). This is due, in large part, to difficulty in
gathering data relevant to selection decisions. Indeed, most of the data that is available is
vastly restricted. In most cases, the only information readily available is the name of the
person who was nominated. In general, little to no information is known about who the
president considered for the nomination. Some speculation occurs about presidents’ short
lists, particularly when it comes to the Supreme Court (Epstein, Landes and Posner, 2013;
Nemacheck, 2008); however, this information is largely unavailable for lower court appoint-
ments and the information that is available, even for the Supreme Court, is not necessarily
a complete set of potential nominees who were considered. As a result, literature analyzing
selection has done so through formal theory (Choi and Gulati, 2004; Krehbiel, 2007; Moraski
and Shipan, 1999; Rohde and Shepsle, 2007) or by giving summary information about judges
who were appointed (see e.g., Clark, 2003; Danelski, 1964; Goldman, 1999; Slotnick, 2003).
Empirical literature looking more broadly at selection has done so by examining aspects of
the selection decision for which data are more readily available. Such empirical literature
has looked at when the president makes his selection decision after a vacancy is first opened
(Binder and Maltzman, 2004; Massie, Hansford and Songer, 2004; Shipan and Allen, 2011)
and the factors that affect promotion either within the federal judiciary (Black and Owens,
2012; Epstein, Landes and Posner, 2013; Savchak et al., 2006) or from state supreme courts
(Bratton and Spill, 2003).
This chapter contributes to the theoretical literature about judicial appointments. In this
chapter, I focus on the portfolio of appointments to the full judiciary rather than individual
appointments to a particular level of the judiciary. In doing so, I am able to better anticipate
how the president makes decisions at each level.
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The literature to date analyzing appointments to the federal judiciary has developed a
thorough understanding of the appointment process. Scholars have shown how the president
makes his decisions about when to fill vacancies (Binder and Maltzman, 2002, 2009; Massie,
Hansford and Songer, 2004; Shipan and Allen, 2011) and who to nominate (Abraham, 2008;
Epstein and Segal, 2005; Goldman, 1999; Moraski and Shipan, 1999; Nemacheck, 2008), along
with how the Senate decides whether to confirm or reject the nomination (Epstein et al., 2004;
Epstein and Segal, 2005; Epstein et al., 2006; Johnson and Roberts, 2004; Martinek, Kemper
and Van Winkle, 2002; Massaro, 1990; Overby and Strauss, 1992; Scherer and Steigerwalt,
2008; Silverstein, 1994; Segal, 1987; Segal, Cameron and Cover, 1992; Stratmann and Garner,
2004) and how long it waits before confirming (Bell, 2002; Epstein and Segal, 2005; Jo, 2011;
Nixon and Goss, 2001; Scherer and Steigerwalt, 2008; Shipan and Shannon, 2003; Stratmann
and Garner, 2004). Despite each step of the process being analyzed in isolation, the findings
about each element of the process are remarkably consistent. The empirical literature looking
at judicial appointments finds that both the ideology and qualifications of potential nominees
are important determinants of who is selected and confirmed and that constraint from the
Senate can affect who is selected and when. This suggests that rather than each step of the
process occurring in isolation of the other steps, perhaps one underlying process produces
the results from each of these scholarly works. In this chapter, I will investigate the extent
to which a single model of appointments can explain all of these phenomena.
In developing this model, I do not intend to negate or undermine any one theory or set of
theories about judicial appointments, but rather, I seek to uncover a broader theory under
which each of these individual theories can be explained that can also explain new aspects
of the appointment process. This model is meant to bridge together existing theories by
relying on what is known about the process from decades of scholarly work.
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Selecting Judges: A Portfolio of Appointments
Standard models of selection in political science are not adequately structured to handle
portfolio problems. However, models of these types of decisions are exceedingly common in
economics literature. In economics, scholars often think about the allocation of people to
goods or workers to jobs and have developed models that can optimally match two groups
of people or one group of people to goods or jobs (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Hall, 1935;
Ko¨nig, 1931; Pentico, 2007; Roth, 1984; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Votaw, 1952). These
types of models, which come in two varieties, matching and assignment models, seek to find
an optimal matching of the two groups that minimizes some overall cost function for the
complete match. These models range from exceedingly simple, where there are some equal
number of agents and goods that need to be matched, to more complex variants of the simple
model where certain aspects are changed to accommodate specific problems with the basic
model, such as one group is larger than the other or multiple people can be matched with
one good or position (see, e.g., Aggarwal, Tikekar, and Hsu, 1986; Balinski and So¨nmez,
1999; Shapley and Scarf, 1974).
In a matching model, some group of individuals must to be matched with either another
group of individuals or a group of goods. Each individual has preferences over matches.
One example of such a model is the matching of hospital residencies to doctors (Gale and
Shapley, 1962; Darley, 1959; Roth, 1984; Stalnaker, 1953). In this model, there exists a
group of hospitals and a group of doctors. Doctors give a rank ordering of their preferred
hospitals and hospitals give a rank ordering of their preferred residents. To match the two
groups, the algorithm starts with the doctors’ rankings. If the hospital at the top of the
doctor’s rankings has the doctor in its top q slots, where q is the number of positions that
the hospital has open, the two are tentatively matched. For any doctors not yet matched, if
they are in the top q slots of their second choice hospital’s rankings, the two are tentatively
matched. This process continues until the end of the doctors’ rankings has been reached.
The model updates by removing doctors from the rankings of all hospitals that are lower
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on the doctor’s ranking than their tentative match. The algorithm repeats to find new
matches. If a new match makes a doctor better off, the new match replaces the old one. This
process of updating continues until no new matches are made. This approach is formulaic of
matching models. There exists two groups that must be matched and a matching algorithm
is devised to optimally match the groups. Other examples of matching models include
marriage models, matching of buyers to houses, or coeds to dorm rooms (see e.g., Gale,
1962; Shapley and Scarf, 1974). There are two main variants of matching models, two-sided
models (for a review, see, Roth and Sotomayor 1990), such as the residency matching model,
where both groups have preferences over matches, or one-sided models where only one group
has preferences over matches.
Assignment models are very similar to matching models.2 A typical assignment model
consists of a group of agents (or employees) and tasks of equal sizes that need to be matched in
such a way that the total cost of the assignments is minimized. The matching is constrained
such that each task is assigned to one agent and each agent only one task. Variants of this
model have incorporated qualifications into the assignment process, where not all agents are
qualified for all tasks (Caron, Hansen and Jaumard, 1999).
In creating a model of judicial appointments, I start conceptualizing the model in a vein
that is similar to these matching and assignment models in the economics literature. I am
interested in finding the portfolio of judges that maximizes the president’s payoff. While
the model that I describe in this section bears some resemblance to these other models,
ultimately there are a number of differences between the model that is best suited to this
problem and these other models because of unique components of the judicial appointment
process.
There are a number of aspects of the appointment process that must be captured in the
model. First, the model must be able to select the optimal matching of judges to positions,
which is determined by the group of judges that are appointed to a court. Second, there are
2For a good overview of these models, see Pentico (2007).
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two components of the individuals being matched that determines the optimal set of judges.
I assume that the president wants to appoint judges who are ideologically similar to himself,
but also that there is some premium for the qualifications of the judge appointed. Third, the
model must be flexible to allow positions to remain unfilled in the judiciary. Finally, although
this is a model of presidential decisionmaking, and I am interested in the portfolio of judges
that optimizes the president’s payoff, there is an external actor, the Senate, who can block
these appointments. Ultimately, the model must incorporate each of these elements into the
matching process.
The judges, or potential judges, have some set of courts to which they would prefer to
be appointed. I assume that each potential judge in the talent pool desires to be on a court
and has a preference to be placed on the highest court possible. For judges who are already
on a federal court, they have a preference to be elevated to a higher court. These preferences
are captured by the choice sets for the different positions. I assume there exists some pool
of potential judges within the population. The size of this pool may vary.3 Members of the
talent pool can be appointed to any position within the judiciary.4 Judges on district courts
can be promoted to either circuit courts or the supreme court and the judges on circuit
courts can be promoted to the supreme court. As a result, the choice set for the supreme
court consists of the talent pool and all judges on the district and circuit courts; the choice
set for circuit courts consist of the members of the talent pool living in the circuit and all
3I simulate the model with three different sizes for this pool.
4Some may take issue with this assumption because not all judges are likely to be considered for all
positions, mostly because they are not qualified for every position. The president’s payoff function consists
of a cost for appointing unqualified judges (and the threshold for determining qualified judges is higher for
higher courts). This cost serves to limit the appointment of judges to courts for which they are not qualified
if the cost of appointing an unqualified judge outweighs the shift in court output for appointing her. While
in theory all members of the pool could be appointed to all positions, and based on Article II of the United
States Constitution, there is nothing preventing this occurring, in practice, the costs serve to differentiate,
to some extent, the choice sets that will be considered for each position. Furthermore, sometimes judges are
nominated to positions for which they are not necessarily qualified, such as the nomination of Harriet Miers
to the Supreme Court.
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judges on the district courts in the circuit; and the choice set for district courts consists of
all members of the talent pool living in the district.5
For this model to provide information about the portfolio of judicial appointments, it is
necessary to match potential judges with positions. There are a couple of ways to go about
this. One would be to use actual data about selection pools. This is not a feasible option
because there is little information known about who is considered to fill positions within the
judiciary. Short of having a list of names considered, but not chosen for, particular positions,
this type of model cannot provide any information about who is selected. Another way to
gain insight into the portfolio of appointed judges is to simulate appointments. This is the
approach that I will take in this model. I simulate a talent pool and judiciary to be matched
and use the results of the simulations to gain insight into the appointment process.
The president’s objective is to allocate judges to positions within the judiciary such
that his payoff function is maximized. The president’s payoff is determined, in part, by his
distance from each court (ctj), for all J courts in the judiciary. J is equal to the one supreme
court, the C circuit courts, and the D district court. For this model, I use 4 district courts
and 2 circuit courts. I restrict the number of courts for the sake of efficiency. I assume that
judges can only be appointed to the district and circuits in which they live, so this approach
does not limit possible appointments that would occur if there were a larger judiciary. This
structure allows for comparison within each level as well as comparison across levels. The
ideology for each court is determined by the decision rule for that court. Supreme Court
cases are decided by a simple majority of 5 justices, so the median member of the court is the
best approximation of court output. Circuit court cases are decided by randomly selected
three judge panels. The decision rule on the panel is majority rule. As a result, the expected
court location is equal to the average median for all possible three judge panels. To calculate
5Judges for United States District Court vacancies are often chosen from potential judges living in the
district (or at the very least living in the state) and Courts of Appeals vacancies are at times tied to a
particular state, so only potential judges living in that state are considered (Giles, Hettinger and Peppers,
2001). As a result, I assume that potential judges are only considered for a vacancy if they live in the district
or circuit.
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this value, I take the median for each permutation of three judges on the circuit and take the
average of those median scores. District court cases are decided by a single randomly selected
judge. The best approximation of district court decisions is the mean ideology score for the
judges on the district court. The weights, wlevel(j) reflect the importance of the court in the
judicial system, where level(j) indicates whether court j is a district, circuit, or supreme
court. A common assumption about appointments to the United States Federal Judiciary
is that Supreme Court appointments are more important, or carry more weight, because of
the importance of this court in the judicial hierarchy. Epstein and Segal (2005) suggest that
often the president takes a much more active role in these appointments. If Supreme Court
appointments are more important than those to lower courts, it follows that circuit court
appointments should also hold more weight than district court appointments. To account
for this diversity in the import of appointments, I incorporate these weights to account for
how much each court is valued by the president. I assume the weight increases for each level
of the judiciary. The ideological component of the president’s payoff consists of a summation
of the divergence of each court in the judiciary from the president multiplied by the weight
for the court’s position in the judiciary.
The president’s payoff is also determined in part by the qualifications of the judges who
are appointed. For the purposes of this model, I assume that the president does not care
about the judge’s qualifications because of any intrinsic value in having qualified judges, but
rather qualifications factor into the president’s payoff as a cost that he pays for appointing
unqualified judges. This cost might best be thought of as a cost paid in political or public
capital for choosing to appoint an ideologue judge who is unqualified.6 The cost for ap-
pointing an unqualified judge is equal to some basic cost for the level of the appointment
(ca,level(i)), where level(i) indicates the level where the judge is appointed, multiplied by the
inverse of the judge’s qualification score, qi ∈ (0, 1]. Because the qualification scores are less
6A good example of this type of appointment is George W. Bush’s 2005 appointment of Harriet Miers to
the United State Supreme Court.
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than 1, taking the inverse of these scores will make the cost paid for appointing unquali-
fied judges larger for judges who are less qualified. As with the weights for court ideology,
I assume that this cost is higher for higher courts because the stakes are higher for these
appointments. The cost is equal to some positive value if the judge’s qualifications fall below
the threshold of qualifications for the court, and 0 otherwise. The total cost for the portfolio
of appointments is equal to the sum of the cost for each of the N judges selected in the
portfolio.
The payoff function consists of the ideological component described above, which is de-
termined at the court level and a qualification cost component which is determined at the
individual level of each appointment. The president’s payoff function is:
uP = −
J∑
j=1
wlevel(j)(ctj − p)2 −
N∑
i=1
ca,level(i)
(
1
qi
)
(2.1)
Some may question if all three levels of the judiciary should be incorporated into a single
model together. This would only be problematic if different processes determine appoint-
ments to different levels of the judiciary. The findings of previous literature are consistent
with respect to what matters for appointment and confirmation decisions: for appointments
to all levels of the judiciary, decisions are dictated in large part by the ideology and qualifi-
cations of the judges (Binder and Maltzman, 2009; Epstein and Segal, 2005; Epstein et al.,
2006; Martinek, Kemper and Van Winkle, 2002; Segal, 1987; Segal, Cameron and Cover,
1992). The only differences that exist between levels is the degree to which these compo-
nents matter. This suggests that it is the same process that drives appointments to each
level of the judiciary, and the only thing that differs between levels is degree. The weights
in the model allow the president to place greater emphasis on certain appointment decisions
without dictating a specific behavior with respect to where judges are placed. By incorpo-
rating different weights and different costs for vacancies at each level, the model is able to
handle these differences in the importance of vacancies at each level of the judiciary.
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The two main components of the president’s and Senate’s payoff functions are the ideology
and qualifications of the potential judges. I use these two components because previous
literature consistently finds that these are the main components that factor into nomination
and confirmation decisions (Binder and Maltzman, 2009; Epstein and Segal, 2005; Epstein
et al., 2006; Martinek, Kemper and Van Winkle, 2002; Segal, 1987; Segal, Cameron and
Cover, 1992). For this model, I assume that there is perfect information about the ideology
and qualifications of potential judges. This assumption is prudent in the sense that nominees
are vetted prior to appointment. However, uncertainty over each of these components might
certainly be present, especially when considering utility over future decisions, because judges’
ideologies can change once they are on the court (Epstein et al., 2007; Epstein, Landes and
Posner, 2013; Martin and Quinn, 2007; Black and Owens, 2012). In future extensions of this
model, I intend to incorporate this kind of uncertainty to see how it might affect appointment
decisions.
I do not incorporate the Senate’s preferences directly into the president’s payoff function.
There is no reason to anticipate that the president gains or loses any utility based on how
well the Senate does in the president’s appointment decisions. Instead, the Senate exists as
a different actor in the model and only factors into the president’s calculation by blocking
or accepting nominees. Again, I assume there is perfect information and that the president
knows whether the Senate will accept a nominee based on her ideology and qualifications.
The Senate makes its decisions with respect to its own payoff function. If the Senate receives
a greater payoff for accepting a nomination, then it will do so.
The president appoints judges to positions such that the appointments maximize his
overall payoff. However, the judges must be approved by the Senate. The Senate’s payoff is
also determined by the court locations and the qualifications of the judges appointed. For
the most part, the Senate’s payoff function is identical to the president’s payoff function, but
with the Senate’s ideology rather than the president’s. However, the Senate also pays a cost,
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cr,level(i) multiplied by the judge’s qualification score, for rejecting qualified judges.
7 As with
the cost for appointing unqualified judges, the cost is greater for higher courts and increases
for judges who are better qualified.8 The total cost for each round of the model is equal to
the sum of the costs for each of the M nominees that the Senate blocks. The Senate’s payoff
function is:
uS = −
J∑
j=1
wlevel(j)(ctj − s)2 −
N∑
i=1
ca,level(i)
(
1
qi
)
−
M∑
i=1
cr,level(i) (qi) (2.2)
In this model, I am necessarily limiting the role and complexity of the Senate. A broad
literature suggests that there are multiple important and potentially pivotal actors in the
Senate (Aldrich and Rohde, 2000; Cox and McCubbins, 2007; Krehbiel, 1998; Primo, Binder
and Maltzman, 2008). In this model, I summarize the Senate’s role with a single ideology
score. This is, primarily, a model of presidential decisionmaking and while the Senate mat-
ters for the purposes of potentially constraining the president, the internal workings of the
Senate only matters to the extent that it constrains the president. Since, there is always
some ideology that is potentially constraining, summarizing the Senate with a solitary ide-
ology is not nearly as problematic in practice as it first appears. In fact, in many models
of interactions between Congress and other political institutions, Congress is summarized
through a solitary ideology or as an interval of ideologies (see, e.g., Hettinger and Zorn,
2005; Segal, 1997).
7Note, in this model, rejection never occurs. Instead, the Senate functions to block nominations; I assume
that there is perfect information so the president knows if a judge would be rejected if nominated. He does
not select any judge who would be rejected. The Senate still pays the cost for blocking the judge, because
the president could in theory appoint the judge and make the Senate pay the cost. However, the portfolio
of appointed judges only includes those judges who the president chooses to nominate and who would be
confirmed by the Senate. In future extensions of this model, I plan to relax this component and incorporate
uncertainty over rejection to see when the president appoints nominees explicitly to make the Senate pay
the cost of rejecting, perhaps to curry more favor in the next round.
8An important note on the judges’ qualification scores: experience on a federal court increases the judge’s
qualification score. As a result, judges on district and circuit courts often have higher qualification scores
than judges who have no federal court experience (and judges on circuit courts have higher scores than those
on district courts). As a result, this cost is paid more often when the president promotes from within the
judiciary.
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While surely, the results of the model would be more interesting by incorporating more
information about the Senate process, or adding more pivotal ideologies for the Senate, for
the most part, the results of the model are not affected by this limitation and to the extent
that they are, this model would underestimate any constraint effects. This model essentially
assumes that a single member of the Senate is pivotal for all confirmation decisions within
the Senate at a given time. This would only not be the case if different Senators mattered
for different appointments. If this were true, it would likely yield more extreme results than
the current results of the model. Consider how the results would change if blue slip Senators
served to constrain appointments.9 Because only Senators from the nominee’s home state
can block the nominee through a blue slip, different ideologies would matter for different
appointments. However, for each potential nominee, at most two Senators could constrain
the president’s decision about where to nominate the potential judge. Each potential judge
can only be considered for a position on one district court, one circuit court, and one supreme
court. The same Senator would serve as a constraint for nominations to the district or circuit
court because the blue slip process is determined by the nominee’s home state.10 Since no
blue slip process exists for the supreme court, a different Senator (median of the Senate,
judiciary committee median, etc.) would pose the potential constraint for nomination to the
supreme court. If the home state Senator is unlikely to submit a negative blue slip, then
the pivotal Senator defaults to the same Senator for the supreme court nomination. For
all states where this is the case, the results of the model as currently presented hold. For
states where this is not the case, the ideology of the blue slip Senator likely poses a greater
constraint than the default Senate ideology, otherwise the Senator would not need to present
9For lower court appointments, Senators from the nominee’s home state are sent a blue slip, in which
their opinion of the nominee is requested. If a Senator sends back an unfavorable blue slip for the nominee,
this often serves to effectively block confirmation of the nominee.
10While there are two Senators from every state that could submit a negative blue slip, in the literature, this
constraint is summarized using a single ideology score for each state, which is determined by the likelihood
that a negative blue slip will be submitted (Binder and Maltzman, 2002, 2004).
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a blue slip to block the nomination.11 As a result, when a blue slip threat is present, the
president faces greater constraint for placing the potential judge on a lower court. For all
states where this blue slip threat is present, the president would then be biased towards not
appointing the judge or appointing the judge to the supreme court. If blue slip Senators
are the pivotal actors in the Senate, any results of the model that predict where a potential
judge is nominated or that predict non-selection of a judge would be biased. The results of
the model are already biased towards placing judges on higher courts, so this result would
not change if the model was adjusted to allow blue slips Senators to be pivotal, but the
magnitude of the effect would likely be stronger. As for other results that might change by
incorporating blue slip ideology, it is likely that more vacancies on courts where a blue slip
threat is present would be left unfilled. Because the vacancy result is already determined
based on the level of constraint the president faces, this result would still hold but instead
be based on the level of constraint for the particular court. Thus, it seems that while some
results of the model might change slightly by incorporating multiple ideologies (or more
specifically, by incorporating the blue slip process), these changes would be minimal, and
likely only make the current results even stronger.
In order to find the portfolio of appointments that optimizes the president’s payoff, I
could look at all permutations of possible portfolios to find the best one. Because this
model has many more possible judges than vacant positions, the number of permutations
is unwieldy. Instead, I hard-wire some assumptions into the matching algorithm that make
these permutations unnecessary. A graphical depiction of the process is shown in Figure 2.1.
The algorithm is as follows:
1. Vacancies occur randomly.12
11Because this process is largely private, there is no reason to expect that Senators symbolically block
nominees. As a result, the Senator will only present a blue slip if, without their attempt to block the
nomination, the nominee would be confirmed.
12This requires an assumption that vacancies occur randomly within the judiciary, which surely some
might take issue with given literature that suggests that judges retire strategically (Barrow and Zuk, 1990;
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Figure 2.1: Matching algorithm within each round of the model
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2. Lists of judges or potential judges located between the president’s ideology and the
status quo are compiled for each court.13
3. The lists for each court are aggregated into a master list.
4. Starting with the judge who is located closest to the president, the president’s payoff
is calculated for each possible appointment for that judge.14
5. If the president receives a higher payoff for appointing the judge to at least one of the
positions than for not appointing her to any, the judge is matched with the position
that gives the president the highest payoff and that the Senate will confirm. If the
Hansford and Songer, 2010; Nixon and Haskin, 2000; Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 1995). While a more accurate
model of vacancies would allow judges to decide when to retire, the assumption of random vacancies does not
affect any of the results of the model. This model yields predictions about the president’s strategy for filling
vacancies given the ideology of the Senate and the status quo (or the ideology of the court if the president
does not fill any vacancies). Allowing strategic retirements in the model would only affect the location of
the status quo (since the judges retiring would be more closely centered around the president’s ideal point).
This assumption does not, however, affect the president’s strategy for filling vacancies given the location of
the status quo and the location of the Senate. This assumption would only affect the results if the president
could force judges to retire, because the decision of who to appoint would not be exogenous to the status
quo location. There is little reason to believe that this occurs in appointments to the United States Federal
Judiciary.
13I impose this restriction for two reasons. The first reason is a practical one: it limits the number of
possible judges who could be placed into each position. The second reason concerns presidential strategy.
Without imposing this restriction, the model would tend to select extreme judges who would move the court
output location as close to the president as possible, especially for lower courts where the court location is
determined using a mean. Because means are not robust to outliers, selecting extreme judges will move the
mean closer to the president, but at the cost of appointing judges who will make extreme decisions. This
type of appointment is rare in practice, so I impose the restriction that the president will not appoint judges
who are more extreme than himself. The results of the model hold when I lessen this restriction by allowing
the president to select judges who are more extreme than himself, but not farther away from his ideology
than the status quo for each court. The general relationships hold when loosening this assumption, though
the strength of the relationships change. Another approach that might ensure that extremist judges are not
selected would be to include a variance component into the president’s payoff. In other words, the payoff
function would include the quadratic loss component as well as a cost for the variance of the ideologies on
the court. This would ensure that extremist judges who shift the mean, but increase the variance, would
not be selected. In future extensions of the model, I intend to incorporate this variance component into the
model.
14To determine the president’s payoff, the new judge is placed on the court and the new court location
is calculated and placed into the president’s payoff function. If the appointment is a promotion within the
judiciary, the judge is removed from their current court and placed on the new court, both court locations are
calculated, and the president’s payoff is calculated. If the judge’s qualification score falls below the threshold
for the court, the qualification cost is also added into the president’s payoff function.
20
Senate will not confirm the judge to any of the president’s preferred positions, the
Senate pays the maximum cost for blocking the nomination.
6. If the president does better by not appointing the judge (or if the Senate will block
the appointment to any position), the president moves on to the next closest judge.
7. Steps 4-6 repeat until all vacancies are filled or until all judges have been considered
for all positions.
This algorithm relies on a number of assumptions about the appointment/matching pro-
cess. First, the president does best by considering judges starting with the judge closest to
his own ideology. Because I assume that the president will not appoint judges more extreme
than himself, this assumption is straightforward. The largest shifts in court output will
occur from appointments that are farthest away from the court’s current location, and thus
located as near to the president’s ideal point as possible.15,16
A second assumption is that once a judge is matched with a position, she will not be
moved later in the matching algorithm. This assumption requires another assumption, that
the president has some preference for appointing like-minded judges to higher courts. The
rationale for this assumption is relatively straightforward. If the judge is best matched with
a district court position, each additional judge appointed to the court that is located between
15This is not necessarily true for the Supreme Court because the decision rule dictates that the median
member determines the location of the Court’s output. As a result, the court location can only move to one
of three locations (either of the ideal points of the two judges next to the current median or the ideology of
the new judge) with the introduction of a single member (regardless of how extreme that judge’s ideology
is).
16The only time this assumption might be problematic is when a vacancy is filled through promotion,
because promoting a judge moves two court locations. If promoting the judge moves the position of the
judge’s current court farther away from the president, the president might be able to do better by appointing
a judge from a different court or who is not currently serving in the judiciary, even if the judge’s ideology
is farther away from the president’s. However, if the president has some preference for appointing more
like-minded people to higher courts, then the president would want to promote the judge to the position
even though it might move the lower court’s position away from his ideal point so long as there is some
increase in his payoff for doing so. Because the president can fill the vacancy created by the promotion with
someone who will shift the court some of the way back to the president’s ideal point, this assumption is less
problematic in practice.
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the president’s ideal point and the status quo will move the court’s location closer to the
president. As a result, moving any of the judges to a different court would shift the court
location further from the president. If the judge is best matched with a higher court, the
decision rules on these courts are such that multiple judges yield similar court locations.
However, if the president has some premium for appointing judges located closer to his ideal
point to higher courts, this assumption is fine. This additional assumption seems reasonable
not only because appointments to higher courts are often assumed to be more important,
but also because while a number of judges may yield the same median given the current set
of vacancies, when future vacancies occur, having a judge located at (or very near to) the
president’s ideal point increases the probability that future medians will be located nearer
to his ideal point.
A third assumption is similar to the second assumption; each sequential matching decision
is made without concern for how the rest of the vacancies will be filled. Another way to
think about this is to assume that each matching decision is made with the assumption
that all other judges further away from the president will not improve the president’s payoff
and as such the president will leave all additional vacancies empty. Because the president
begins selecting nominees with the judges that are closest to his ideal point, no judge who
will be considered later in the matching process will improve the court’s location more than
the current judge. Furthermore, each match in the algorithm must increase the president’s
payoff over what his payoff was in the last step of the matching process. As a result, all
other vacancies will only be filled if the president receives an increase in his payoff for doing
so. The other assumptions cover any judge (or set of judges) farther away from the president
that would yield the same court location or that would give a better overall payoff because
another court position is not moved farther away from the president.
The final assumption works in conjunction with the third assumption: future appoint-
ments will not change the Senate’s preferences over the current judge. At first glance, this
assumption seems problematic, but because of the matching algorithm, this assumption is
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not problematic in practice. The president begins filling vacancies with the judge closest
to his ideal point and will never appoint an additional judge unless the Senate will approve
both judges. If the Senate approved the first judge in an earlier step in the algorithm, either
the judge improved the court’s location relative to the Senate’s ideal point (in which case
rejecting the judge in a later round will move the court away from the Senate’s ideal point)
or the Senate accepted the judge because the cost of rejecting the judge outweighed the
movement in the status quo away from the Senate’s ideal point (which will still be the case
if the Senate rejects the judge in a later round).
A few final notes on the computational setup for the model. The model is dynamic in the
sense that the president’s actions in the last round of the model affect his decisions in the
current round.17 Each round (or iteration) represents a year. I assume that Senate elections
occur every 2 years and presidential elections every 4. In a presidential election year, with
some probability, the president stays in office and the ideology of the president carries over
for another 4 years, otherwise a new president is randomly chosen. In a Senate election year,
with some probability the Senate’s ideology shifts slightly (the same party retains control),
and a small value is added to the Senate’s ideology score, otherwise a new ideology score
is chosen at random. At the end of each year, some set of judges leave the talent pool of
potential judges and are replaced by a smaller group of potential judges centered around the
president’s ideal point. Programming details for the computational model are presented in
Appendix A in Chapter 6.
Results
To get a better sense of the model presented above, I start with a small example. Consider
the judiciary in Table 2.2.1.
17The model is not dynamic in terms of strategy. The president and Senate do not consider the payoffs
they would receive in future rounds, rather the decisions in each round are independent of decisions that will
be made in future rounds.
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Level 1 2 3 4 5
Supreme Vacant (.9,6.5
12
) (-.2,8.5
12
)
Circuit (.9,4.5
12
) Vacant (-.1,9.5
12
) (-1,6.5
12
) (.5,5.5
12
)
District (.1,10
12
) (.5, 9
12
) (.4, 4
12
)
Talent (-.5, 4
12
) (-.7, 7
12
) (.4, 3
12
)
Table 2.1: The judiciary consists of one supreme court, one circuit court, and
one district court. Judges on a court can be promoted to higher positions in
the judiciary. There is a talent pool of potential judges that can be appointed
anywhere within the judiciary. The columns indicate the individual member of
each court or talent pool. The judges and potential judges are represented by
their ideology and qualification scores: (ideology, qualifications). Consistent
with the qualification scores in the computational model, these qualification
scores are meant to reflect an additive scale for qualifications, which are an-
chored by the highest possible level of qualifications, 12.
To make this example tractable and easy to explain, I have limited the size of the judiciary
to one supreme, one circuit, and one district court. I have also decreased the size of these
courts to 3 members on the supreme court, 5 on the circuit court, and 3 on the district court.
The talent pool consists of 3 members. The president’s ideal point is .6 and the Senate’s, -.2.
If the president does not appoint any judges, he receives a payoff of -6.75. This will serve as
a baseline to determine whether judges are appointed. To find the portfolio of judges that
will maximize the president’s payoff, I use the algorithm for the model. I denote a judge or
potential judge using the level where they are currently situated in the judiciary: (t, d, c,
or s) and the position where they are located in Table 2.2.1. For example, the judge on the
district court who is in the first column in Table 2.2.1 is denoted as d1 and has an ideology
of .1 and qualifications of 10
12
.
1. Vacancies occur. There are two vacant positions in the judiciary: one on the supreme
court and one on the circuit court.
2. Lists of judges or potential judges located between the president’s ideology and the status
quo are compiled for each court. Using the median, the supreme court status quo is
-.55. Using the mean of the medians of all possible permutations of three judge panels,
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the circuit court status quo is -.5. The judges whose ideologies are located between the
president’s and the status quo for the supreme court are t1, t3, c3, c5, d1, d2, and d3.
The judges whose ideologies are located between the president’s and the status quo for
the circuit court are t1, t3, d1, d2, and d3.
3. The lists for each court are aggregated into a master list. The list of all possible judges
to be considered are: t1, t3, c3, c5, d1, d2, and d3.
4. Starting with the judge who is located closest to the president, the president’s payoff
is calculated for each possible appointment for that judge. The judge closest to the
president’s ideal point is c5. This judge is already on the circuit court, so she can
only be appointed to the supreme court vacancy. If the president appoints c5 to the
supreme court, his payoff is -6.78.18
5. If the president receives a higher payoff for appointing the judge to at least one of the
positions than for not appointing her to any, the judge is matched with the position that
gives the president the highest payoff and that the Senate will confirm. If the Senate will
not confirm the judge to any of the president’s preferred positions, the Senate pays the
maximum cost for blocking the nomination. The president’s payoff does not increase
for appointing the judge to the vacant position.
6. If the president does better by not appointing the judge (or if the Senate will block
the appointment to any position), the president moves on to the next closest judge.
Because, the president does better for not appointing the judge, the next judge is
considered.
7. Steps 4-6 repeat until all vacancies are filled or until all judges have been considered
for all positions.
18Note, because this judge is already on a court, she must be removed from her current position and the
new circuit court location must be calculated in addition to the new supreme court location.
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(a) The next closest judge is a two way tie between t3 and d3. For both judges,
the president’s payoff is calculated for appointing the judge to the circuit court
vacancy and to the supreme court vacancy. His payoff increases for appointing
either judge to either court, but the Senate would reject any nomination and
because neither potential judge has high qualifications, the Senate pays no cost
for doing so. The next closest judge is considered.
(b) The next closest judge is d1. If d1 is appointed to either court, the president’s
payoff increases, and his payoff is greatest for appointing to the supreme court.
The Senate’s payoff is higher for approving the nomination to the supreme court
than rejecting, so d1 is appointed to the supreme court. Because the judge is
promoted from a district court, there are now vacancies on the circuit and dis-
trict courts. Because there are still vacant positions, the process continues. The
president’s baseline payoff when considering judges for the remaining vacancies is
now his payoff for having appointed d1 to the supreme court, which is -4.76.
(c) The next closest judge is d2. Because this judge is on the district court already, she
can only be appointed to the circuit court. The president’s payoff is improved by
appointing d2 to the circuit court, but the Senate’s payoff is higher if it rejects.
The judge’s qualifications are above the threshold for the circuit court, so the
Senate pays the cost for blocking the nomination.
(d) The next closest judge is t1. The appointment of t1 to any position makes the
president worse off, so she is not appointed to any position.
(e) There are no judges remaining from step 3, so the algorithm ends. In this example,
the president appoints d1 to the supreme court vacancy and leaves the resulting
district court appointment and the circuit court appointment open for future
rounds.
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This preliminary example reveals a number of features of this model. Conventional
wisdom about appointments suggests that both the circuit and supreme court vacancies
should have been filled by judges with ideologies near to the president’s ideal point. The
qualifications of the judges played a key role in this example; many of the judges located
near to the president’s ideal point were not qualified for the vacant positions. Constraint
also played a role in these results. The judges who were close to the president’s ideal point,
who were also qualified, were not so qualified that the Senate would pay a cost to reject
them, so the nominations were blocked. The finiteness of the pool of judges also affected
the results. A number of key differences in the parameters of the model could have yielded
different results, including the judges in the judiciary, the size and composition of the talent
pool, and the president and Senate’s ideal points. To yield more in-depth predictions from
the model, I turn to simulation.
When considering more realistic numbers of possible judges, such as 500 or more, and a
more realistic judiciary, this type of model is best approached through simulation. I have
simulated 5000 iterations of the model for three different initial talent pool sizes: 500, 1000,
and 2000. For each run, I store information for only the latter 3000 iterations of the model.19
The Supreme Court in the model consists of 9 members; the size of the 2 circuit courts are
modeled after the 9th and the 5th circuits, which have 29 and 17 judges respectively; the
district courts are modeled after the Central District of California and the Arizona District
in the 9th circuit, which have 28 and 13 judges respectively, and the Southern District of
Texas and the Eastern District of Louisiana in the 5th circuit, which have 19 and 12 judges
respectively. The 9000 simulated iterations of the model for which I have saved the matched
appointments provide roughly 67,000 appointments to analyze. The results of the model are
presented below.
Ideology of Judge
19This will ensure that any initial effects of the random seed chosen are not captured in the results of the
model that I analyze.
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There are a number of potential variables of interest in this model. One of the most
obvious is the ideology of the judge. One of the main questions that can be answered
by this model that has not been addressed in previous literature is where the president
appoints the judges whose ideologies are most similar to his own. To get a sense of the
ideologies of the appointed judges, I have graphed the matched appointments in density plots
in Figure 2.3. This graph shows the proximity of the judge by the level of the appointment.
The graph is further broken down by the level of constraint that the president faces from
the Senate. I define a president’s constraint as the location of his ideal point relative to
the Senate and the status quo (or the reversion point if no appointments are made). For
the remainder of this chapter, I conceptualize constraint as either binary, the president is
constrained because he disagrees with the Senate over where to move the status quo, or
as “regimes” of constraint, the president is either unconstrained, semi-constrained, or fully-
constrained, similar to Moraski and Shipan (1999). Figure 2.2 shows how the arrangement
of the preferences of the president and the Senate and the status quo help to determine the
level of constraint the president faces. The president is unconstrained when the Senate is
located to the left of M, the midpoint between the president and the status quo, which is
the dashed region in Figure 2.2a. If the Senate is located in this region, the president can
appoint a judge at his ideal point and the Senate will prefer the appointment of the judge
to the status quo. The president is semi-constrained when the Senate is located between
M and the status quo, the dashed region in Figure 2.2b. In this region, the Senate prefers
the location of the status quo to the president’s ideal point, so is more likely to reject a
judge located at the president’s ideal point.20 The president is fully-constrained if he and
20Because the payoff functions are calculated using the location of the court once a judge is appointed, and
both the president and Senate prefer a shift in the court in the same direction, the president might still be
able to select a judge located at his ideal point that will yield a court location the Senate prefers to the status
quo in this regime. For the sake of efficiency and space, information is not stored on the compositions of each
court as the matching process proceeds, so it is not possible to tell the exact location at which a judge could
be selected that the Senate would prefer to the status quo. As a result, in the semi-constrained regime, the
president might still be unconstrained in that he can select a judge at his ideal point and the Senate would
confirm. The approach I use here is the best approximation of determining the president’s level of constraint.
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the Senate are located on opposite sides of the court, the Senate is in the dashed region
in Figure 2.2c.21 In this regime, the Senate prefers the location of the status quo to any
movement of the court towards the president’s ideal point based on ideology alone.
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Figure 2.2: President’s level of constraint. The arrangement of the president’s
and Senate’s preferences and the status quo determine the level of constraint
the president faces from the Senate. The president faces a particular level of
constraint when the Senate is located in the dashed region in each subfigure.
Any results that suggest differences between when a president is unconstrained and semi-constrained should
be considered a conservative bound on the differences between these levels of constraint.
21The binary classification (constrained or unconstrained) will suffice when I look at any outcome of the
model for which it only matters whether the president and the Senate can agree on which direction to move
the status quo. For example, when looking at whether the president fills a vacancy. However, this is not
as informative a conceptualization of constraint when considering who is actually appointed. I take the
“regimes” approach for any analysis looking at the actual individual selected, since the expected ideology of
the judge differs based on whether the president or the Senate is closer to the status quo, even if the two
agree on which direction to move the court.
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Figure 2.3: This graph shows the density of the absolute distance between the
president’s ideal point and the ideal points of the appointed judges. The graphs
across the columns correspond to the level of constraint that the president faces
from the Senate: unconstrained, semi-constrained, and fully constrained. The
graphs across the rows correspond to the appointments to each level of the
judiciary: supreme, circuit, and district courts. The scales for each of these
graphs are identical.
In looking at these graphs, a few patterns are immediately evident. First, the president
appoints judges who are closer to his ideal point when he is less constrained and he does so
more consistently.22 One may wonder about the skew in each of these graphs. One of the
main reasons for this skew is that the distance between the president and the status quo
varies within each graph. When the president is farther away from the status quo, the judges
22Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirm that the distributions in these graphs differ significantly.
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appointed are farther away from the president’s ideal point on average than judges selected
when the president is close to the status quo. As a result, when the president is farther from
the status quo, he is more likely to appoint judges farther from his ideal point. The extent
of the skew, however, is particularly interesting. The distribution of the distance between
the president and the status quo is roughly similar among each of these graphs (though this
variable is on average higher in the semi-constrained regime as a result of the measurement
of this variable). However, the skew is much wider in the fully constrained regime than in
the unconstrained or semi-constrained regimes. This suggests that the level of constraint
leads to more judges being selected at locations farther from the president’s ideal point even
controlling for differences in the distance between the president and the status quo. As the
president becomes more constrained, the mean distance between the president and appointed
judges increases for all courts. The skew of the appointed judges’ ideal points also increases
as the president becomes more constrained. Second, when the president is unconstrained,
he appoints judges who are closest to his ideal point to higher courts. The skew in the
judges’ ideologies are also smaller for higher courts when the president is unconstrained.
This relationship starts to change when the president is semi-constrained. Though the
modal judge appointed to the supreme court in this regime is still closer than the modal
judge appointed to lower courts, the skew for the judges appointed to the circuit courts is
smaller than for the other courts when the president is semi-constrained. When the president
is fully-constrained, this pattern changes even further. When the Senate and the president
disagree over which direction to move the court, the judges who are most ideologically similar
to the president are placed on circuit courts (with a lower skew for these judges). The next
closest judges are placed on district courts and then the supreme court. This likely has
to do with the decision rule on these courts. The average shift in court location following
the appointment of judges is roughly similar for the supreme and circuit courts when the
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president is fully-constrained, with the larger shift occurring on the supreme court.23 This
suggests that appointments on circuit courts have a smaller impact on the location of the
court than those to the supreme court. Still, the variance of the ideologies of the judges
appointed to the supreme court when the president is fully-constrained is much larger than
that of judges selected to circuit courts, indicating that the president’s ideology is not as
good a predictor of the ideology of judges appointed to the supreme court.
Some of these results are likely driven by the assumptions underlying the algorithm of
the matching process, particularly assumptions two and three. If the president were to move
judges in later steps of the matching algorithm (or consider appointments that could occur
in later steps), this would likely have the greatest effect on the proximity of supreme court
appointments. Because a number of judges move the median to the same location, the
closest judge need not be appointed to the supreme court to yield the same court output.
However, for reasons stated previously, it is still likely that the president would place the
most ideologically similar judges on the supreme court. If this assumption were relaxed, I
expect that the “best” judges would move to lower courts later in the matching algorithm,
thereby potentially changing this result. However, while on average, the closest judges are
placed on the supreme court, the closest judge could be placed on a lower court in the
matching process for one of two reasons. First, the judge is unqualified for higher courts, so
they are placed on a court for which the president will not pay a cost to appoint. Second,
while there is a greater weight for higher courts built into the president’s payoff function,
meaning that any shift in court output for appointing a judge to higher courts is magnified
over a similar shift for a lower court appointment, if the lower court is particularly far away
from the president, appointing the judge to a lower court may result in a change in court
output that can outweigh the shift that would occur if the judge were appointed to a higher
23This is measured as the difference between the court’s location before any appointments are made and
the court location after all appointments are made in a particular year. The average shift in court location
is smaller for district courts in this regime than for the circuit and supreme courts.
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court, even accounting for the difference in these weights. As a result, at times even if the
best judge is qualified for all positions, she is still placed on a lower court.
This initial result is promising. Conventional wisdom about judicial appointments sug-
gests that judges who are most similar to the president will be appointed to higher courts,
which is confirmed in the results of this model. While the model is structured such that there
is some bias towards this result, it does not hold for each iteration of the model, nor does this
finding hold when the president is most constrained. This not only provides some external
validity to the model, but also suggests that this model provides some new hypotheses to
test about when this conventionally held understanding about judicial appointments does
not occur in practice.
Qualifications
Another interesting dynamic of the model concerns the qualifications of the appointed
judges. The mean qualifications of the judges matched in the simulations are plotted in
Figure 2.4. The qualifications are graphed per court for each level of constraint.
The qualification scores of the appointed judges always increase for higher positions. This
result makes sense given the structure of the model. The qualification thresholds are higher
for higher courts, so more qualified judges are appointed to these courts. Additionally,
the qualifications increase as the president becomes more constrained. This result makes
sense in light of the costs for rejecting qualified nominees. As the president becomes more
constrained, he has a greater incentive to choose judges whose qualifications are above the
threshold at which the Senate would pay a cost to reject the judge. This ensures that the
Senate will be more likely to confirm the judge and will do so if the cost for rejecting exceeds
the shift in the court location from the Senate’s ideal point. Furthermore, the variance of the
qualifications of the appointed judges decreases for judges selected when the president is fully
constrained. While the variance is roughly the same when the president is unconstrained
and semi-constrained for each level of the judiciary, the variance is much smaller when the
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Figure 2.4: Qualifications of Appointed Judge. The y-axis is the qualifications
of the appointed judges. Values towards the top of the graph represent judges
with higher qualifications. Each point on the graph is equal to the mean
qualifications for judges selected to a particular court when the president faces
a certain level of constraint. 95% confidence intervals are shown around each
mean.
president is fully constrained, since he must selected judges whose qualifications are above
the threshold or the Senate will reject his nominees.
Promotions
A new dynamic that this model predicts is the type of judge that is appointed. The
model predicts when the president is more likely to promote within the judiciary versus
filling vacancies with new talent. Empirical literature has been surprisingly silent on the
question of promotions within the judiciary, with just a few articles published about the
instances in which certain judges are most likely to be promoted (Black and Owens, 2012;
Epstein, Landes and Posner, 2013; Savchak et al., 2006). What this model suggests is that
there are certain instances in which promotion is more likely in general. Figure 2.5 shows
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the percentage of vacancies that are filled through promotion on the circuit courts and the
supreme court as the president becomes more constrained.24
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Figure 2.5: Percentage of vacancies filled through promotion. The y-axis mea-
sures the percentage of vacancies that are filled through promotion. The x-axis
measures the level of constraint the president faces from the Senate, with the
president being either unconstrained (none), semi-constrained (semi), or fully-
constrained (fully).
A few patterns are evident from this graph. First, promotions are more likely, in general,
to the supreme court than they are to circuit courts. This result makes sense if for no other
reason than the fact that there are more people to promote to the supreme court. Not
only does this result make sense intuitively, it is a widely understood empirical reality about
judicial appointments. Since 1981, 80% of nominations to the Supreme Court have been
promotions within the judiciary. On circuit courts, only about 30% of nominations were
promotions in the same time frame. That the matching model can predict this result that is
24This graph only shows the promotion rate when there is at least one position to fill on the court. The data
points used to create the graph are calculated using the average promotion rate in each category (so for circuit
courts or the supreme court when the president is unconstrained, semi-constrained, or fully-constrained).
95% confidence intervals are graphed around the means.
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taken as a fundamental truth about appointments, provides a great deal of support for the
other results of the model.
More interestingly, the promotion rates change as the president becomes more con-
strained. On both the circuit and supreme courts, there is no change between when the
president is unconstrained and semi-constrained, but there is an increase in promotion rates
when the president is fully-constrained.25
There are two main reasons to expect more promotions as the president becomes more
constrained. First, when the president is constrained, he can generally leverage appointments
of judges who are located closer to his ideology when the nominee is better qualified. Because
current judges have higher qualification scores on average and the pool of non-judges with
qualification scores comparable to the current sitting judges is much smaller, it becomes
increasingly more likely that vacancies will be filled through promotion. Second, when the
president is fully-constrained, the Senate and president disagree over which direction to
move a particular court. If the president promotes a judge from a lower court, he moves the
location of two courts: the court where the appointment is made and the court where the
judge is promoted from. Because the president and Senate have divergent preferences about
where they want court outputs, this results in a compromise of sorts: the one court is moved
towards the president and the other is moved towards the Senate (because the judge being
removed is close to the president’s ideal point). As a result, the president is not only able to
leverage the qualifications of the judge, but also the additional movement of the lower court
location. The qualification cost and lower court movement not only work together to help get
judges approved by the Senate, but they also work separately. The president does at times
25This result is contingent on the qualification threshold for the Senate’s rejection cost. In the results
presented, I have set the threshold at a level such that the Senate pays a cost for rejecting members of
the talent pool that have particularly high qualification scores. If the threshold level is set at a higher
qualification score, where no new judges have qualification scores that are high enough to make the Senate
pay a rejection cost, then all vacancies are filled through promotion when the president is constrained (but
vacancies are filled with new judges when the president is unconstrained). This occurs because when the
president is constrained, he mostly appoints judges whose qualification scores are above the cost threshold
(though he does appoint judges who are not above this threshold, but only when he promotes or when the
judge does not move the location of the court).
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appoint judges whose qualifications are below the threshold when he is fully-constrained,
but in each instance, the appointment is a promotion within the judiciary.26
An additional dynamic that affects promotion rate is the size of the talent pool. Because
I simulated the model using three different sizes of initial talent pools, I am able to see
how often vacancies are filled through promotions as the size of this pool changes. There
exists a negative correlation between the size of the talent pool and the rate of promotions.
As the size of the pool increases, there are more potential judges with high qualification
scores. Additionally, since there are more judges, more of these highly qualified judges
will be located close to the president’s ideal point, decreasing the need for the president to
promote. This result is fairly straightforward. If there are more new people who can be
appointed, the president is more likely to find judges who are qualified and located close to
his ideal point.27
Vacancies
A final component of this model that is of interest is how often the president leaves
vacancies open (because he cannot improve his payoff by appointing additional judges). To
think of this in terms of language often used in empirical literature, this is a measure of when
to expect delay in nominations. Figure 2.6 shows the percentage of vacancies left open when
the president is constrained and when he is unconstrained for each level of the judiciary.28
26This is mostly true for the circuit courts. Due to the way that the circuit court ideology is calculated,
it is possible to appoint a judge near the president’s ideal point who does not affect the expected court
output for the court. As a result, at times judges are appointed to circuit courts when the president is fully
constrained whose ideologies are below the threshold for which the Senate will pay a cost to reject, who are
also not promoted, because they will yield no change in the location of the court.
27Again, this result is contingent on the cost threshold level. If the threshold level is sufficiently high
that the president does not appoint new judges, then the size of the talent pool will have no effect on the
promotion rate when the president is constrained.
28To calculate this statistic, I include only those vacancies left open when there is at least one vacancy to
be filled as measured by the sum of vacancies unfilled in the last iteration, the number of vacancies that open
in the current iteration, and the number of promotions that occur in the current iteration that create new
vacancies to be filled. The data points used to create this graph are measured using the average percentage
of vacancies unfilled for each court for each level of constraint. 95% confidence intervals are graphed around
the means.
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The interplay between the president and the Senate is often cited as the reason that there
are so many vacant positions in the judiciary. Even the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court will specifically appeal to both in his year end report (Rehnquist, 2002;
Roberts, 2010). Figure 2.6 shows that a larger percentage of positions are left open when
the President is constrained. This effect is largest for the supreme court, with smaller effects
for the circuit and district courts.
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Figure 2.6: Vacancy rate. The y-axis measures the percentage of vacancies
that are still open at the end of each round of the model. The x-axis measures
the level of constraint the president faces (either unconstrained or constrained).
Still, the graph in Figure 2.6 is not overly compelling, particularly for the district and
circuit courts. If constraint does not fully explain judicial vacancies, what other factors might
play a role in the persistence of judicial vacancies? One question is how the persistence of
vacancies affects the vacancy fulfillment rate. There are often long runs of vacancies that
build up within the judiciary. Why does this happen; is there some self-fulfilling component
to these built up vacancies? Figure 2.7 shows how the number of “inherited vacancies”, or
vacancies carried over from a previous year, affect the president’s ability to fill vacancies in
the current year. To create this graph, I estimated a logistic regression of the proportion of
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vacancies that are left open at the end of each round on the number of vacancies “inherited”
from the previous round, whether it is the president’s first year, and an interaction between
the two.29 This figure shows the predicted proportion of unfilled vacancies for each possible
value of “inherited” vacancies. I have graphed these predictions for new and continuing
presidents with 95% confidence intervals surrounding the predictions.
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Figure 2.7: Vacancy rate. The y-axis measures the predicted proportion of
unfilled vacancies. The x-axis measures the number of vacancies that carry
over from the previous round.
This figure suggests that the number of vacancies that are “inherited” from previous
rounds of the model affects the rate of unfilled vacancies. As the number of “inherited”
vacancies increases, the percentage of vacancies that are left open in the current round
increases. This effect differs for new and continuing presidents. For new presidents, the
29I use a measure of vacancies that were open in the geographic area of the court at the end of the last
round. For district courts, this means the vacancies on the district court, its circuit court, and the supreme
court. For circuit courts, this is all vacancies on the circuit court, the district courts in the circuit, and the
supreme court. For the supreme court, this is equal to all vacancies in the judiciary. I use the geographic
vacancies rather than just the vacancies on that court because all courts in the geographic region have
overlapping choice sets, so it is expected that all vacancies on those courts will affect one another.
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rate of unfilled vacancies is always lower than for continuing presidents.30 The effect of
“inherited” vacancies is also much smaller for new presidents than continuing presidents.
Another factor that contributes to the rate of vacancies is the distance between the
president and the court’s status quo location. Figure 2.8 shows the vacancy rate as the
distance between the president and the status quo increases. For each point on this graph,
the vacancy rate is equal to the average number of vacancies open when the distance between
the president and the status quo is between the value at that point and .1 plus that value.
So for 1.3, the vacancy rate is equal to the mean vacancy rate when the distance between
the president and the status quo is in (1.3,1.4].
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Figure 2.8: Vacancy rate. The y-axis measures the percentage of vacancies
that are still open at the end of each round of the model. The x-axis measures
the distance between the president and the status quo.
For the most part, as the distance between the president and the status quo increases, the
percentage of vacancies that are left open decreases. When the president is sufficiently far
from the status quo, he fills all vacancies. This result is straightforward; when the president
30It is worth noting that because a new president is in his first year, it is expected that he will fill as many
vacancies as possible to begin moving the courts towards his ideal point.
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is farther away from the court, appointing more judges will move the court closer, but when
he is relatively close to the court, there is likely some point at which appointing more judges
will not improve the location of the court, so he leaves vacancies open.
A final dynamic that affects the vacancy rate is the size of the talent pool. Figure 2.9
shows the percentage of vacancies that are left open on each court for each initial talent pool
size.
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Figure 2.9: Vacancy rate. The y-axis measures the percentage of vacancies
that are still open at the end of each round of the model. The x-axis measures
the initial talent pool size.
There is a noticeable decrease for each court for larger talent pool sizes in Figure 2.9.
For the district and circuit courts, there is a consistent decrease in the vacancy rate as the
talent pool size increases. For the supreme court, there is no difference in the vacancy rate
for talent pool sizes of 500 and 1000, but there is a statistically significant difference between
talent pool sizes of 500 and 2000 and 1000 and 2000.
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Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented a model matching potential judges to positions within
the judiciary. This is the first scholarly work to consider the portfolio of judges appointed
to the judiciary rather than individual appointments. In addition, this is the first model to
examine multiple stages of the appointment process at once. I do this by creating a model
in which vacancies occur throughout the judiciary and the president must fill the vacancies
with new talent or by promoting judges within the judiciary. The model predicts not only
who is selected, including information about whether the judge is promoted from within the
judiciary, but also when the president delays filling vacancies.
The results of this model are very encouraging. Many of the results are consistent with
previous research or conventionally held wisdom about judicial appointments: the president
appoints judges located as close to his ideal point as possible, the “best” judges are placed
on higher courts, and disagreement with the Senate affects both the timing to nomination
and the ideology of the judges that are selected. In addition, the results of this model
produce a number of new hypotheses about the appointment process both about when
certain expectations from previous research break down as well as new variables that affect
vacancy rate and promotion decisions.
As with any theoretical model, this model is an abstraction of the process. As a re-
sult, there are a number of potential extensions to this model and future research should
explore many of these extensions. Such extensions include: incorporating multiple pivotal
players in the Senate; adding additional players, such as interest groups, into the model;
adding uncertainty about Senate rejections; adding uncertainty about judges’ ideologies and
qualifications; and allowing judges’ ideologies to shift once they are on the court.
Judicial appointments are an important part of any presidency. As the quote that
opened this paper suggests, for a president, judicial appointments “may be his most profound
legacy”. The model that I have presented in the paper shows that a number of key elements
factor into the decisions that the president makes. First, the composition of the judiciary
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and pool of judges from which the president can appoint affect the number of vacancies
that are left unfilled, the ideology and qualifications of the judges selected, and the way in
which vacancies are filled (either through promotion or by selecting a new judge). Second,
a large determinant of delay in filling vacancies is the number of vacancies that build up in
the judiciary. When a president inherits vacancies from a predecessor, or allows vacancies
to build up in the judiciary within his own presidency, his ability to fill vacancies is affected
and there is more delay in filling vacancies. Lastly, this model suggests that Senate con-
straint affects each of the components of judicial appointments. When the president faces
constraint from the Senate, he selects judges with different ideologies and qualifications,
there is more delay in filling vacancies, and he is more likely to fill vacancies through promo-
tion rather than selecting new judges. This model suggests that the bulk of the president’s
appointment decisions can be explained simply by the composition of the current judiciary,
his position relative to the Senate, the number of vacancies that need to be filled, and the
size and composition of the talent pool of judges he can appoint. As these four parameters
change, the president’s behavior with regard to when and how he fills vacancies changes as
well. Many of these parameters suggest that vacancies in the judiciary are interdependent
and this interdependence helps to determine the president’s decisions with regard to how he
treats each vacancy. Future research should further examine this interdependency between
judicial appointments, including when to anticipate that the president appoints judges to
lower positions in the judiciary in order to groom them for advancement within the judiciary
later.
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Chapter 3
Selection Mechanisms and the Judges
Selected
On behalf of the Judiciary, I urge the President and the Senate to work to-
gether to fix the underlying problems that have bogged down the nomination and
confirmation process for so many years. - Chief Justice, William Rehnquist, 2002
As this quote from former Chief Justice, William Rehnquist, suggests, the nomination
and confirmation process for the United States Federal Judiciary is not without its problems.
This quote refers primarily to the vacancy rate that persists in the federal judiciary, which
for the last several years has been at around 10%. However, the vacancy rate is not the
only potential problem with the federal appointment process. Richard Davis (2005) suggests
that the nomination and confirmation process, as it was originally intended, is broken and
has become a process where the views of the public, the press, and interest groups play a
large role in determining who is selected. Davis suggests that the middle man be cut out
of the process and vacancies on the United States Supreme Court should be filled through
elections.
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This question of the effectiveness and utility of a particular selection mechanism is not
unique to the federal judiciary. Many scholars of state courts have an interest in selection
mechanisms. Contrary to the federal judiciary, the selection processes for state courts vary
greatly. Some states appoint judges in a manner similar to the federal judiciary, others use
merit commissions to select judges, still others elect their judges either through partisan or
non-partisan elections. This variation in selection mechanisms has lead to a rich literature
which analyzes the role that selection mechanisms play in the behavior of judges on state
courts (Caldarone, Canes-Wrone and Clark, 2009; Canes-Wrone, Clark and Kelly, 2014;
Gordon and Huber, 2007; Hall and Bonneau, 2008; Nelson, Caufield and Martin, 2013).
At the heart of any debate over selection mechanisms lies an interest in the effects that a
particular mechanism has on the judges that are selected and the judiciaries to which they
are selected. For the federal judiciary, this interest lies in the vacancies that result from
the current system, as the quote from Rehnquist above shows, or concern over the president
packing the courts with his ideological allies as recent concern over recess appointments
demonstrates. For state courts, this interest lies in the judges’ qualifications (O’Connor,
2010) and whether judges’ decisions pander to the public (Brace and Hall, 1997; Brace and
Boyea, 2008; Huber and Gordon, 2004).
In this paper, I take this inquiry one step further. I use computational models of four
selection mechanisms to examine the effect that the mechanism has on the judges that are
selected. The results of these models will be compared with the results of the model created
in Chapter 2. I will refer to the model from Chapter 2 as the advise and consent model. In
this chapter, I start with the same base model and concept as that model - that vacancies
must be considered simultaneously and from a restricted choice set - and craft the model to
fit four additional selection methods. First, I model judges selected randomly to provide a
baseline by which all structured selection models can be evaluated. Second, I model selection
by a single actor to illustrate how judges who do not require Senate confirmation differ from
those who must clear this hurdle. Third, I consider judges selected by a voting body. This
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model is consistent with judges selected by a legislature or a court, as is the case in many
American states as well as courts in other countries. Lastly, I model elections of judges
consistent with many American states. These latter three models are selected because they
mimic common selection methods used in the American states.
While the purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of selection mechanisms on
the types of judges selected under those mechanisms, I do so through the lens of how judges
selected to a particular judiciary, the United States Federal Judiciary, would differ under
different selection mechanisms. I will set a number of parameters in the model constant
across all models including the structure of the judiciary, the tenure of judges, and the
structure of the selection pools for each position. These parameters will be consistent with
the federal judiciary. This will allow me to explore how the judges selected differ as the
selection mechanism itself changes.
To see how the judges selected under these mechanisms differ, I compare the results of
each model based on the ideologies of the judges selected (particularly how close they are to
the actors in the model), the qualifications of the judges selected, the vacancy rate, and the
prevalence of promotions. I will show that each mechanism comes with trade-offs. No one
method is best along each of these dimensions. Rather, a method that comes with a lower
vacancy rate might also have less qualified judges. For each model, I examine the ideologies
and qualifications of the selected judges to demonstrate which selection mechanisms provide
for more or less qualified judges and more or less ideological diversity. I also examine the
vacancy rate resulting from each selection mechanism. Some mechanisms require that each
position be filled (elections and random assignment); this helps to demonstrate the trade-offs
that are inherent in each selection mechanism. Finally, I examine how promotion rates differ
across these selection mechanisms. This will help demonstrate how much of a priority each
mechanism places on judicial expertise, which is connected with judges’ qualifications.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe and discuss the model and
results for each of the four new selection mechanisms. I begin with the random assignment
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model, followed by the single appointer model, the voting body model, and the elections
model. I conclude by comparing and contrasting the results of these five mechanisms. To do
so, I focus on the trade-offs of each selection mechanism with regard to ideological diversity,
quality of judges, and the vacancy and promotion rates in the judiciary.
Selecting Judges
Below, I discuss the deviations from the model created in Chapter 2 for each of four
selection mechanisms: random assignment, appointment by a single individual, appointment
by a voting body, and elections.
As with the advise and consent model in Chapter 2, each of these models recognizes
that the appointer(s) must select judges for all three levels of the judiciary concurrently and
that these decisions are not independent of one another. To make a fair comparison across
selection mechanisms, I will set some components of the model stagnant across all models.
The only elements that will change across models are the players, their payoffs and strategies,
and the selection mechanism itself. As a result, the models that are presented below are
not necessarily representative of the selection mechanism for any actual institution. Indeed,
the selection mechanisms for judiciaries in the American states and in other countries are
often quite complex and are not necessarily uniform across all levels of the judiciary, or even
all judgeships on a particular court, as is the case with the federal judiciary. This chapter
is not intended to and cannot answer how judges in the federal judiciary differ from those
in the American states or other countries. Rather, this chapter is intended to address how
judges selected under one system (the federal judiciary) would differ if a different selection
mechanism were used to select judges.
The structure for the judiciary in these four models will mirror that in the advise and
consent model. The judiciary will have three layers: four trial courts, two appellate courts,
and a court of last resort. The selection pools for the three levels will be geographic and
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hierarchic. The selection pools for the trial courts will consist of all members of the talent
pool living in the district, the selection pools for the appellate courts will include all members
of the talent pool in the circuit and the members of the two district courts in the circuit,
and the selection pool for the court of last resort will consist of all members of the talent
pool, the district courts, and the circuit courts.
Random Assignment
As a baseline, the first mechanism I model is one where members of the judiciary are
selected at random from the population, a selection system known as sortition. For millen-
nia, philosophers have suggested that such a process is most representative of a democracy
(Aristotle and Jowett, 2008; de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, 1989; Dowlen, 2009; Plato
and Jowett, 2008). To some extent this random component is already in place in our legal
system through the form of juries, with jury selection pools being selected at random from
members of a community. What are the trade-offs for a system of random assignment rather
than a structured selection process?
This model is unique from each of the structured models to follow in that there are no
actors and as a result, there are no payoffs that determine the allocation of judges. Instead,
the process for placing judges/potential judges into positions in the judiciary is done solely
based on a randomized algorithm. To randomly allocate judges to positions in the judiciary
(but to maintain the geographic and hierarchical restrictions at place in the original model),
I have created an algorithm to randomly fill each vacancy in the judiciary.
1. The potential judges and judges are randomly sorted.
2. Starting with the first judge on this list, the judge is randomly placed on a court that
is higher than the court the judge currently serves on.1
1If the selected judge is currently serving on a court, the judge’s position is added to the vacancies to be
filled for the court the judge is leaving.
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3. If there are no vacancies on any of the courts that are higher than the judge’s current
position and in her geographic region, the judge is not placed and the simulation moves
on to the next judge.
4. This process continues until all vacancies are filled.
For the purpose of showing the results of the simulations of the random assignment model,
and to make these results comparable to the results of the other models, I will graph each
result based on the relationship between an appointer and a confirmer. With each round of
the model, an ideology for each an appointer and confirmer are recorded. These ideologies
do not factor into the appointment mechanism as either a payoff or a part of the matching
algorithm.
Results: Ideology
To summarize the ideologies of the judges selected under random assignment, I have
graphed the distribution of the absolute value of the distance between the judges’ ideologies
and the appointer’s ideology. These graphs are shown in Figure 3.1 for each level of the
judiciary and each level of constraint.
The distribution in each of the nine graphs is roughly equal.2 This suggests that there
are no real differences in the ideologies of the judges selected for higher courts over lower
courts. Additionally, the political environment has no effect on the ideologies of the judges
selected.3 Absent a structured selection mechanism, the ideologies of the judges selected to
2While there appears to be a spike near the appointer’s ideal point and a tapering off after that, this is
a result of the measurement of the variable that is being graphed, not an influence of the appointer’s ideal
point. Because the measure is the absolute value of the distance between the appointer and the appointed
judges, some ideal points can take on a greater range for this variable. For example, a judge whose ideology
is located at the extreme of the ideology distribution can be anywhere from 0 to 2 points separated from
the appointer’s ideology. In contrast, a judge whose ideology is located at 0 can only be between 0 and 1
points separated from the appointer’s ideology. As a result, there is a positive skew in the variable, with
fewer observations at the tail end. Still, the degree of this skew is very small. The bias that is represented
in these graphs is not the result of a bias towards the appointer, but a bias of the individual measure.
3Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests suggest that there are significant differences between the distributions of each
court for each level of constraint. However, this is likely the result of partitioning of the data into different
categories. Since there is nothing in the selection process that would suggest differences between levels of
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Figure 3.1: This graph shows the density of the absolute distance between
the appointer’s ideal point and the ideal points of the appointed judges. The
graphs across the columns correspond to the level of constraint that would
be faced by the appointer: unconstrained, semi-constrained, and fully con-
strained. The graphs across the rows correspond to the appointments to each
level of the judiciary: supreme, circuit, and district courts. The scales for each
of these graphs are identical.
the judiciary are randomly distributed relative to the elite actors in the political system.
Rather, these judge’s ideologies are representative of the pool from which they are drawn. If
the pool of possible judges is representative of the public at large, then this type of system
constraint, these differences can be equated with the sectioning of the data. The means for each court are
roughly equal for each level of constraint, suggesting that the way the regimes separate the data leads to
these differences.
50
ensures that the ideologies of judges in the judiciary are representative of the ideologies in
the public.
Results: Qualifications
The advise and consent model ensured that judges had a minimum level of qualifications.
This was built into the payoff functions for the president and Senate. The qualification levels
should be lower in a random assignment model than in any deterministic models that ensure
qualifications are at a certain level.4 The results for the qualifications of the judges for each
level of the judiciary graphed for each level of constraint are shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: This graph shows the average qualifications of appointed judges
to each level of the judiciary given each value of constraint. 95% confidence
intervals are plotted around the means.
As expected, the qualifications of judges selected under random assignment are lower
than those in the advise and consent model. This is particularly true for the circuit courts
and the supreme court.5 The political environment has no effect on the qualifications of the
4Given that the pool of judges is the same in each model.
5While the qualifications for the circuit and supreme court appointments are still slightly higher than
the qualifications for the district court appointments under random assignment, this is because the selection
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selected judges. This suggests that so long as the pool of possible judges remains the same,
the random model will yield less qualified judges than a structured model would. This model
could produce qualified judges if the qualifications necessary to enter the pool of possible
judges were set at a level similar to the threshold levels for the costs in the advise and consent
models. Absent an increase in the requirements to be placed in the pool, the expected level
of qualifications is the mean qualification score for judges in the choice set for each court.
Without a mechanism such as costs for selecting unqualified judges or rejecting qualified
judges included in the model, the judge’s qualifications would be distributed randomly.
Results: Vacancies
One of the most immediate benefits of this process is that all vacancies are filled. The
random simulation fills each of the vacancies open in the judiciary. As a result, gridlock and
workload do not drive vacancies in the judiciary as is the case with the advise and consent
model.
Results: Promotions
Promotion appears to be a tool that is used to help the confirmation process in the advise
and consent model. Since there is no confirmation process in the random assignment model,
the rate of promotion in this model should be equal to the percentage of the selection pool
for a particular court that is made up of current judges. The promotion rates for the circuit
and supreme courts for each level of constraint are shown in Figure 3.3.
The results are as expected. The rate of promotion is roughly equal to the percentage of
the selection pool that is made up of current judges for both the circuit and supreme courts.
Accordingly, since there are more judges who can be appointed to the supreme court, the
promotion rate is higher for the supreme court. Because the assignment is random, the
political environment does not affect the promotion rates. High promotion rates, particu-
larly on the Supreme Court, appear to be a product of the selection mechanism used to
pools for these positions include members of the current judiciary who have higher qualifications on average
than the members of the selection pool for the district courts.
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Figure 3.3: This graph shows the average proportion of vacancies filled through
promotions on the circuit and supreme courts for each level of constraint. 95%
intervals are plotted around the means.
select judges. Promotion plays a role in helping a judge be confirmed, so the advise and
consent process has produced a system where promotion occurs more frequently. Without
this process, promotions would likely occur at a lower level.6
Single Appointer
In choosing a system for selecting federal judges and other appointed officers in the
United States, there was some recognition that judges might be selected by one individual
(Federalist 76). Ultimately, the inclusion of a second government actor to check the first was
determined to be a better system (Federalist 77). However, elements of a single appointer
6There is some observational equivalence when it comes to promotions as to whether the observed pro-
motion rates result from the selection mechanism. Without knowing how many judges are in the talent pool,
or the pool of possible judges, it is possible that the promotion rates reflect the proportion of judges who
could be appointed who are currently serving on a court. However, this does not explain the disparity in the
promotion rates between the United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals. Given
that the same non-judges could be appointed to both positions you would only expect a slight increase in
promotion rates to the Supreme Court, rather than an increase in the promotion rate of over 200%. Addi-
tionally, as the results of the empirical tests in Chapter 4 reflect, there is an increase in promotion rates to
both types of courts when the president is constrained, suggesting that the advise and consent framework
encourages promotions within the judiciary.
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method remains for federal judges. When the Senate is at recess, the president can appoint
judges to serve for a limited term. Numerous states and countries also use a single appointer
selection process for at least some of their judgeships (AJS 2014; Ministry of Justice 2004).
Additionally, in many American states where judges are elected, if a position becomes avail-
able in the middle of a judge’s term, the governor can appoint someone to fill the position
until the next election at which point the judge can be placed up for election (AJS 2014).
How different are the judges selected under a system with a single appointer from judges
selected with an extra actor responsible for confirming the judges?
To answer this question, this model removes the Senate from the advise and consent
model in Chapter 2. The single appointer fills vacancies based on the payoff he/she receives
for his/her appointments. The appointer’s payoff is the same as the president’s payoff in the
advise and consent model:
uP = −
J∑
j=1
wlevel(j)(ctj − p)2 −
N∑
i=1
ca,level(i)
(
1
qi
)
(3.1)
I assume that the single appointer is still uninterested in choosing judges with low qual-
ifications for the same reasons as in Chapter 2. As a result, the appointer’s payoff consists
of not only a loss in utility based on the locations of the courts in the judiciary, but also
based on the judges’ qualification scores. This cost is identical to the cost in the advise and
consent model. It is only paid if the judge’s qualifications fall below the threshold for that
court, which increases for higher courts in the judiciary. The cost itself is also larger for
higher courts. The algorithm in this model is identical to the algorithm in the advise and
consent model with the exception of the step checking whether the Senate would confirm the
judge. Rather, the appointer selects each judge to the position that gives him the highest
payoff.
The results from the simulations of the model with a single appointer are shown in Figures
1-7. For the purpose of comparing this model with the advise and consent model, I have
graphed the results based on the level of “constraint” that would be faced by an extra actor
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in the model (were the actor to play a role). The expectation is that the second actor’s
preferences should not factor into the appointer’s appointment decisions. To measure this
constraint, the simulations record an ideal point for the extra actor, however this actor’s
ideology does not factor into the appointer’s payoff function or the selection process itself.7
Results: Ideology
Figure 3.4 shows the density distributions for the distance between appointer’s ideal point
and the ideal points of the appointed judges. The graph shows the distribution for judges
appointed to each level of the judiciary for each level of “constraint” that would be presented
by an extra actor.
These graphs reveal two patterns about the ideologies of the appointed judges. First,
the appointer more consistently appoints judges similar to his ideology to higher courts.8
The graphs show that a greater proportion of the density is near to zero for higher courts,
indicating that the appointer is more consistently appointing judges near his ideal point to
these courts. Second, as expected, the level of constraint faced by the extra actor does not
influence the ideologies of the judges who are appointed. The graphs are roughly similar
across the columns, indicating that the ideology of the extra actor relative to the appointer’s
ideal point and the status quo does not influence the ideologies of the judges selected.9
7The Senate’s preferences do not factor into the president’s payoff function in the advise and consent
model, but rather its preferences are used to determine whether it will confirm or reject a given judge to a
position. As a result, the Senate’s preferences factor into the algorithm separately from the president’s in
that model. In the single appointer model, the extra actor’s preferences are not incorporated into either the
payoff function for the appointer or the algorithm for the selection process.
8Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirm these differences.
9Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests show that there are significant differences between the levels of constraint.
As with the differences in the random assignment model, this is likely due to the calculation of the constraint
variable. These differences are most noticeable in the semi-constrained regime. Because constraint is deter-
mined by both the ideology of the external actor and the status quo, when semi-constrained, the president
tends to be further from the status quo on average. This leads to an increase in the mean distance from
the appointer because judges that are farther away from the appointer’s ideal point still increase his payoff
so he is more likely to accept judges who are farther away rather than leaving positions vacant See Figure
3.9 and the discussion below for more about how the distance between the appointer’s ideal point and the
status quo affects the vacancy rate.
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Figure 3.4: This graph shows the density of the absolute distance between
the appointer’s ideal point and the ideal points of the appointed judges. The
graphs across the columns correspond to the level of constraint that would be
faced by the appointer: no constraint, partial constraint, and full constraint.
The graphs across the rows correspond to the appointments to each level of the
judiciary: supreme, circuit, and district courts. The scales for each of these
graphs are equal.
The ideologies of the judges selected in the single appointer model differ from those in
the random selection model, and are more consistently close to the appointer’s ideology than
in the advise and consent model. While Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests show that there are no
differences between the distributions of judges selected in the single appointer and advise and
consent results for the circuit and supreme courts when the appointer is unconstrained and
semi-constrained, there are differences for all levels of the judiciary when the appointer is fully
constrained. This result is particularly interesting in light of the recess appointment process
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that is currently being contested before the Supreme Court. What this model demonstrates,
is that when the president is able to select judges without the approval of the Senate, the
ideologies of the judges are going to be much closer to the president’s ideal point than they
would be if the president required the approval of a Senate with opposing preferences. This
suggests that recess appointments allow the president to momentarily bypass the Senate
to select judges that he prefers to those he could appoint were he to compromise with the
Senate.
Results: Qualifications
An important determinant of the qualifications of the appointed judges in the advise and
consent model is the level of constraint the president faces. In the random assignment model,
there are no differences as the level of constraint changes. Since there is no constraint in
the single appointer model, like in the random assignment model, the qualifications of the
appointed judges should be constant for all appointments. However, the qualifications should
be higher in the single appointer model than the random assignment model because of the
costs associated with selecting unqualified judges. The graph of the mean qualifications for
the judges are shown in Figure 3.5 for each level of constraint that would be faced from the
extra actor.
As this graph indicates, the level of constraint does not factor into the president’s ap-
pointment decisions.10 As would be expected given the costs associated with selecting a
judge with low qualification scores, the judges appointed to higher levels of the judiciary
have higher qualification scores, which is consistent with the result in the advise and consent
model.
Since there is no constraint in the single appointer model, the qualifications of the ap-
pointed judges are roughly similar for all appointments and are fairly cose to the qualifications
10There is a statistically significant (though very slight) dip in the qualifications of judges on the supreme
court when the appointer would be semi-constrained, but not for the other courts. There is, however, not a
statistically significant difference between when the appointer would be unconstrained and fully constrained.
Given that there is no reason to expect there to be a difference, this difference is likely just a result of chance.
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Figure 3.5: This graph shows the average qualifications of appointed judges
to each level of the judiciary given each value of constraint. 95% confidence
intervals are plotted around the means.
of the judges selected when the president is unconstrained in the advise and consent model.11
This seems to suggest that the presence of a confirming actor in the appointment process
increases the qualifications of the selected judges at least when the confirming actor presents
a constraint on the appointer’s ability to select judges whose ideologies are similar to his
own. If the president bypasses the Senate to select judges that he prefers when he is fully
constrained under a recess appointment, he is also likely selecting judges that are likely less
qualified to the positions to which they are being selected.
Results: Vacancies
The vacancy rate in each round of the advise and consent model is a function of the
constraint faced by the Senate, the number of vacancies that carried over from the last
round of the model, the talent pool size, and the distance between the president and the
11There are significant differences between the judges selected when the president is unconstrained in the
advise and consent model and the judges selected in the single appointer model for the district and circuit
courts, but the differences are smaller than the differences between when the president is unconstrained and
fully constrained in the advise and consent model.
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status quo. Without an external actor to constrain the president, in the single appointer
model, the expectation is that the other three factors should contribute to the vacancy
rate. Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of vacancies left open when the appointer would be
constrained by an external actor and when he would not be constrained.
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Figure 3.6: This graph shows the average percentage of vacancies left open for
each level of the judiciary based on whether the appointer is constrained. 95%
confidence intervals are plotted around the means.
There is no significant effect for constraint. The percentage of vacancies left open is
roughly equal when the appointer is constrained and unconstrained for each level of the
judiciary. There are differences in the percentage of vacancies left open for the different
levels of the judiciary. More vacancies are left open on higher courts than lower courts. This
result makes sense in light of the selection pool for each position. The minimum qualification
level that will ensure that the appointer does not pay a cost for selecting an unqualified judge
is higher for higher courts. This ensures that fewer judges in the talent pool can be selected
to these courts without the appointer paying this cost. However, if the appointer selects
from among the current judges in the judiciary, the lower court position will move away
from the appointer’s ideal point which could lead to a net loss in the appointer’s payoff.
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This is especially true when the higher court is located close to the appointer’s ideal point.
As a result, there are fewer attractive judges who can be appointed to these courts, leading
to a higher vacancy rate.
Another factor that contributes to the vacancy rate is the number of vacancies that the
appointer “inherits” from the last round of the model. As with the advise and consent model,
the appointer serves a four year term. I have graphed the predicted proportion of vacancies
left open based on the number of vacancies that carried over from the last round for both
new and continuing appointers in Figure 3.7.12
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Figure 3.7: This graph shows the predicted percentage of vacancies left open
for each level of the judiciary based on the number of vacancies inherited from
the last round of the model. 95% confidence intervals are plotted around the
predictions.
The number of inherited vacancies has no effect on the percentage of vacancies left open
for new appointers. For continuing appointers, the results are consistent with the advise and
12To determine the predicted percentage of vacancies, I have estimated a logit model using the number
of vacancies left open divided by the number of vacancies to be filled regressed on the number of vacancies
that carried over from the last round, a variable indicating whether it is a new appointer, and an interaction
between the two.
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consent model. The more vacancies that the appointer opted not to fill in the last round of
the model, the more vacancies he will leave open in the current round of the model.
Two additional factors that contribute to the vacancy rate are the size of the talent pool
(or the number of possible judges to appoint) and the distance between the appointer and
the status quo. The expectation for the former is straightforward: the greater the pool of
judges from which the appointer can select, the more likely it is that he will find a judge that
he prefers to the status quo to fill each position. The second expectation, that the distance
between the appointer and the status quo will contribute to the number of vacancies, is also
fairly straightforward. If the appointer is close to the status quo, there will be fewer possible
judges who can improve the location of the court relative to the appointer’s ideal point.
Since the appointer will only select new judges to the extent that they continue to improve
the location of the court relative to his ideal point, if the appointer is close to the status
quo, he is likely to leave more vacancies open. The results for the talent pool and the status
quo are shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9.
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Figure 3.8: This graph shows the average percentage of vacancies left open for
each level of the judiciary based on the size of the talent pool. 95% confidence
intervals are plotted around the means.
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Figure 3.9: This graph shows the average percentage of vacancies left open
for each level of the judiciary based on the distance between the appointer’s
ideal point and the status quo. 95% confidence intervals are plotted around
the means.
Both of the results are as expected. As the size of the talent pool increases, fewer vacancies
are left open. This effect is larger for lower courts. This results from the composition of the
selection pools for higher courts. For district courts, the selection pool is made up solely of
potential judges from the talent pool. For the higher courts, the selection pool also consists
of judges currently serving in the judiciary. As a result, an increase in the talent pool size has
a smaller impact on higher courts because the percentage increase in the selection pool size
is smaller. Additionally, because judges must have higher qualifications on higher courts for
the appointer to avoid paying a cost, fewer members of the talent pool are feasible options
to the appointer, creating an even smaller change in the portion of the selection pool that
will actually be considered when the talent pool size increases. The results for the distance
between the appointer’s ideal point and the status quo is also as expected. The farther away
the appointer is from the status quo, the more vacancies that he fills. Conversely, when the
appointer is closer to the status quo, more vacancies are left open.
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As anticipated, while constraint plays no role in this model, the number of inherited
vacancies, the size of the talent pool, and the distance between the appointer and the status
quo all contribute to the vacancy rate. An important difference in the effect of inherited
vacancies is the effect for new appointers. In the advise and consent model, the inherited
vacancy effect was smaller for new presidents, but still there was an effect. In the single
appointer model, there is no statistically significant effect for inherited vacancies for new
appointers. This suggests that this effect, which is largely one of workload effects for the
president or appointer, is compounded by the confirmation process. The vacancy rate is also
higher for the most part in the advise and consent model than the single appointer model,
at least when the president is constrained. There are no differences in the distribution of
the vacancy rates between the two models when unconstrained, but vacancy rates are higher
when the president is constrained in the advise and consent model.13 This suggests that
not only does a structured model help to determine the vacancy rate in the judiciary over
what would occur in a random assignment model, but the structure itself also influences the
effects of other variables on the vacancy rate.
Results: Promotions
Finally, given that constraint played a role in determining when promotions were more
likely in the advise and consent model, how common are promotions in a model where there
is a single appointer? I anticipate that the promotion rates should still be higher than in the
random assignment model because of the appointment costs for selecting unqualified judges,
but that the promotion rates should be lower than in the advise and consent model. The
promotion results are shown in Figure 3.10.
For circuit courts, the results are as expected. The rate of promotion is roughly similar to
the unconstrained rate in the advise and consent model and there is no change as the external
actor provides more “constraint”. The results for the Supreme Court are a bit surprising.
Here there is a moderate increase in the proportion of vacancies filled by promotion when the
13As determined by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
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Figure 3.10: This graph shows the average proportion of vacancies filled
through promotions on the circuit and supreme courts for each level of con-
straint. 95% confidence intervals are plotted around the means.
appointer is fully constrained over when unconstrained, though no difference between semi-
constrained and either unconstrained or fully constrained. However, this increase is much
smaller than in the model that includes the external actor as a check on the appointer’s
power.14
The presence of a confirmation process affects how often judges are selected through
promotion within the judiciary. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests suggest that there are no dif-
ferences between the advise and consent and single appointer models for the distribution
of promotion rates when the appointer or president is unconstrained or semi-constrained.
The confirmation process contributes to an increase in promotion rates, but only when the
president and Senate disagree. This suggests that the increased promotion rates in the
United States Federal Judiciary that have been seen in the last century may be a product
of increased disagreement between the Senate and the president.
14As with the slight dip in the qualification result, this is likely a result of chance.
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Voting Body
Several states choose judges through legislative appointment. A number of other countries
allow for the courts to fill their own vacancies. These selection mechanisms have a similar
underlying feature: judges are selected by a voting body. How does this selection mechanism
differ from a two tiered selection by a president with Senate confirmation or a one tiered
selection by a single actor?
A wealth of literature exists about the determinants of the outcomes of votes within a
voting body (Arrow, 1951; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Krehbiel, 1998). While some theories
suggest that the outcome of votes will represent the median or pivotal member’s preferences
(Black, 1948; Downs, 1957; Krehbiel, 1998), I have chosen to model this selection mechanism
as a voting body with unique players and a structure that limits convergence to the median,
rather than thinking of appointment by a voting body as the equivalent of the preferences
of one member of the body and thus a single appointer model. To the extent that a voting
body can be thought of as equaling the median voter’s ideal point, the results for a voting
body would equal the results of the single appointer model.
To introduce structure into the voting body, I have incorporated an agenda setting mecha-
nism. Literature has shown that the agenda, and particularly agenda setting power, is crucial
for determining voting or bargaining outcomes (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Cox and McCub-
bins, 2005; Romer and Rosenthal, 1978; Jeon, N.d.). The median member’s preferences are
still important for determining who is selected in this model: this actor’s vote will serve
as a veto on the judges who are selected. However, one actor has proposal power and can
choose judges who will improve the median member’s payoff over the status quo (no judges
are selected) but still select judges who are close to his own ideal point. Proposal power will
allow the proposer to make a take it or leave it offer of appointments on which the other
members of the voting body will vote up or down. The proposer need not select judges at
the other actors’ ideal points to get them to vote for the proposal, he needs only select judges
that make the other members better off than the status quo.
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I model a three member voting body. Each member’s ideology is chosen at random from
[-1,1]. I create “parties” for the purpose of determining proposal power. I do so because it
is likely that the proposal would come from one of the two people who share some common
feature such as party. This process approximates the role of party gatekeeping in a legislature,
which is consistent with literature emphasizing that parties affect outcomes by setting the
agenda (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007). The parties are loosely created such that all
members in [-1,0] are in one party and all members in (0,1] are in another party. If all three
members of the voting body are in the same “party”, the proposer is chosen at random from
all three members. If not, the proposer is chosen at random from among the two members
in the “majority party”.
Each member in the voting body casts her votes based on the payoff she receives. The
payoff function for each member is the same as the payoff function for the appointer in
the single appointer model and the president in the advise and consent model. The payoff
functions for the individuals in the voting body are determined based on the ideologies of
the courts in the judiciary and the individual qualification scores for the judges that are
selected. The payoff function for each member is:
uVk = −
J∑
j=1
wlevel(j)(ctj − vk)2 −
N∑
i=1
ca,level(i)
(
1
qi
)
(3.2)
where vk is the ideology of the kth member of the voting body, V . Each of the other
components of the model are the same as in the advise and consent and single appointer
models.
The structure of the matching algorithm is similar to the one in the advise and consent
model.
1. For each court, all judges and potential judges who are located between the proposer’s
ideal point and the status quo, and who are currently in a lower position in the judiciary,
are compiled into a list.
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2. These lists are all compiled into a master list and sorted according to their distance
from the proposer.
3. Starting with the judge/potential judge whose ideology is closest to the proposer, the
proposer considers placing the judge on each court for which she is eligible. The
proposer then places the judge on the court that gives him the highest payoff that at
least one other member of the voting body will vote for.
4. If there is no placement that makes the proposer better off that will receive at least
two votes, the proposer moves on to the next closest judge.
5. Steps 3-4 continue until all vacancies are filled or all judges have been considered for
all positions.
Members of the voting body are elected into office every two rounds. With some proba-
bility, the member will be reelected and the ideology of that member will continue for two
more rounds, otherwise a new ideology is chosen at random. A new proposer is selected at
random at the start of each round of the model.
There are a number of similarities between the voting body model and the advise and
consent model. Both models include one player who makes the first move in selecting judges.
The structure of both models ensures that this player has an advantage. In both models, this
first player must obtain the approval of at least one other player. As a result, this player can
be constrained by the other players in the model. A big difference between the two models
is in the payoff functions for the extra player(s) in the model. In the advise and consent
model, the rejection of judges is visible, so there is a cost for rejecting judges. No such cost
exists in the voting body model because I assume that the voting behavior of members in
the voting body is less transparent than a Senate rejection.
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The results for the simulations of the voting body model are below. I measure constraint
in this model the same as in the advise and consent model.15,16
Results: Ideology
The single appointer and advise and consent models consider the proximity of the ap-
pointed judges to the appointer’s ideal point. In this model, I consider the proximity of the
appointed judges to the member of the voting body with proposal power. Figure 3.11 shows
the density plots of the absolute distance between the appointed judges and the proposer.
The plots are arranged based on the level of the judiciary and the level of constraint the
proposer faces from the median member of the judiciary.
As with the results of the advise and consent model, when the proposer faces greater
constraint from the median, he appoints judges whose ideologies are farther from his own.17
Additionally, the proposer appoints judges who are closer to his own ideology to positions
that are higher in the judicial hierarchy (meaning that he appoints judges whose ideologies
are more similar to his own to the supreme court over circuit courts, etc). Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests show that the differences between levels are significant when the proposer
is unconstrained or semi-constrained, but that there are no significant differences in the
distributions of the ideologies of judges selected when the proposer is fully constrained.
15I assume that the median voter (on the ideology dimension) is the relevant pivotal actor. While there are
two dimensions, ideology and qualifications, so the member with the median ideology is not necessarily the
pivotal member, the primary dimension is the ideology of the judges, with an additional incentive (shared
by all members) not to appoint low quality judges. The qualification costs are the same for each member.
As a result, if the median member does not approve of a judge near the proposer’s ideal point, the third
member will also not approve of the judge because she is farther away from the proposer’s ideal point than
the median and pays the same cost as the median for the judge’s qualifications. Because the voting rule is
majority rule, the proposer only needs to get one other member to vote with him. As a result, he will select
a judge that the nearest member will vote for. If the proposer is not the median, this person will be the
median. If the proposer is the median, then he can choose between the two members on opposite sides of
him and select the member whose ideology is closer. The expectation, therefore, is that the median will be
in any winning coalition.
16Constraint is measured in the same manner as in the advise and consent model with the proposer as the
president and the median as the Senate. The proposer is unconstrained when the median is the proposer.
17Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirm that the differences between the distributions are significant for each
level of the judiciary.
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Figure 3.11: This graph shows the density of the absolute distance between
the proposer’s ideal point and the ideal points of the appointed judges. The
graphs across the columns correspond to the level of constraint the proposer
faces: unconstrained, semi-constrained, and fully constrained. The graphs
across the rows correspond to the appointments to each level of the judiciary:
supreme, circuit, and district courts. The scales for each of these graphs are
identical.
The results of the ideologies of the judges selected in the voting body model are very
similar to those in the advise and consent model. The president in the advise and consent
model does do moderately better than the proposer in the voting body model, suggesting
that the dynamics of a voting body lead to less beneficial outcomes for the primary selector.
Results: Qualifications
One of the primary reasons that better qualified judges are appointed when the presi-
dent is constrained in the advise and consent model is that the Senate pays a cost to reject
qualified nominees. Because such a cost does not exist in this model, the appointed judges’
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qualifications will not necessarily be higher when the proposer is constrained. The qualifica-
tion results are in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12: This graph shows the average qualifications of appointed judges
to each level of the judiciary given each value of constraint. 95% confidence
intervals are plotted around the means.
There is an increase in the judges’ qualifications when the proposer is fully constrained
over when he is unconstrained for the circuit courts and the supreme court. There is no
significant difference in the qualifications of appointed judges on the district courts as the
proposer becomes more constrained. The result for higher courts likely follows from the
increased promotion rates when the proposer is constrained by the median. Because the
average qualifications of judges that are serving on a court at the time they are selected are
higher than the average qualifications of judges in the talent pool, the judges selected when
the proposer is constrained should have higher qualifications since they are being promoted
from a lower court. See the discussion below for more on how constraint contributes to
promotion rates.
Even compared to the voting body model, the advise and consent framework ensures
that better qualified judges are selected, at least when the president is constrained. When
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unconstrained, there is no difference in the qualifications of judges selected to district courts
between the advise and consent and voting body models.18 When semi-constrained, the
qualifications of judges selected under the voting body model are more in line with the single
appointer model and are indistinguishable from those selected under the single appointer
model for the district and circuit courts and for district courts, this holds when the proposer
is fully constrained. While there are drawbacks to the advise and consent model, it appears
to provide the best qualified judges of any of the direct appointment methods.
Results: Vacancies
Constraint, the number of vacancies that carried over from the last round of the model,
the talent pool size, and the distance between the president and the status quo all contribute
to the vacancy rate in the advise and consent model. Because of the similarities between
the voting body model and the advise and consent model, I expect all of these factors to
contribute to the vacancy rate in the voting body model as well. Figure 3.13 shows the
percentage of vacancies left open when the proposer is constrained by the median member
and when he is not constrained.
Constraint plays a large role in the percentage of vacancies left open when judges are
selected by a voting body. When the proposer is constrained, the vacancy rate increases
by about 400%. This effect is much larger than in the advise and consent model. The
primary reason why the effect is so much larger in the voting body model is the lack of
costs associated with the median blocking appointments. In the advise and consent model,
the Senate pays a cost to reject judges who are qualified, thereby making it easier for the
president to appoint judges when he is constrained. In the voting body model, without this
cost in place, constraint by the median member leads to large increases in the vacancy rate.
There are no differences between the levels of the judiciary when the proposer is uncon-
strained. When the proposer is constrained, the district courts have a higher rate of vacancies
than the supreme and circuit courts, but there is no difference between the supreme and cir-
18As shown by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the distributions of the judges’ qualifications.
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Figure 3.13: This graph shows the average percentage of vacancies left open
for each level of the judiciary based on whether the appointer is constrained.
95% confidence intervals are plotted around the means.
cuit courts. See below for a discussion of how constraint factors into promotions in this
model, which is why fewer vacancies are left open on higher courts than district courts when
the proposer is constrained.
This suggests that gridlock plays a larger role in determining vacancies in a voting body
than it does in an advise and consent framework. While there is a lot of focus on the role
that gridlock plays in the vacancy rates in the federal judiciary, what this model suggests
is that it could be much worse. The visibility of the confirmation process helps to keep the
effect of gridlock to a minimum.
Another factor that contributes to the vacancy rate is the number of vacancies that the
proposer “inherits” from the last round of the model. A new proposer is chosen in each
round of the model, so there are no continuing proposers as in the advise and consent and
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the single appointer models.19 I have graphed the predicted percentage of vacancies given
the number of vacancies carried over from the last round of the model in Figure 3.14.20
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Figure 3.14: This graph shows the predicted percentage of vacancies left open
based on the number of vacancies inherited from the last round of the model.
95% confidence intervals are plotted around the predictions.
The effect of “inherited” vacancies is similar in this model to the effect for continuing
presidents/appointers in the advise and consent and appointer models. The percentage
of vacancies left open increases as the number of vacancies inherited from the last round
increases. In addition to the increased role of gridlock in contributing to vacancies in the
voting body model over the advise and consent model, the workload effect of the number of
19Because the ideologies do not change every year, and there are only three players in the model, there is
a chance that one member of the voting body may be proposer two years in a row. To see if this drives the
inherited vacancy result, I have also checked the results separating out new proposers from these “continuing”
proposers. The curve looks very similar to the curve in Figure 3.14 for new proposers, though softens slightly,
and the predicted vacancy rate changes to one much sooner for continuing proposers than the curve in Figure
3.14. Still, the result for new proposers is more similar to continuing presidents/appointers in the advise and
consent and appointer models than for new presidents/appointers, suggesting that the presence of inherited
vacancies has a more pronounced effect in the voting body model than the other models.
20To determine the predicted percentage of vacancies, I have estimated a logit model using the number
of vacancies left open divided by the number of vacancies to be filled regressed on the number of vacancies
that carried over from the last round.
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vacancies is also larger in this model over the other appointment based models. Overall, the
vacancies are higher in the voting body model over the other appointment based models.
Two additional factors that contribute to the vacancy rate are the size of the talent pool
(or the number of possible judges to appoint) and the distance between the proposer and
the status quo. The expectations for the effects of these two variables are the same as in the
other models. Both increases in the talent pool size and the distance between the proposer
and the status quo should lead to lower vacancy rates. The results for the talent pool and
the status quo are shown in Figures 3.15 and 3.16.
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Figure 3.15: This graph shows the average percentage of vacancies left open for
each level of the judiciary based on the size of the talent pool. 95% confidence
intervals are plotted around the means.
Both of the results are as expected and consistent with the other models. As the size of
the talent pool increases, fewer vacancies are left open. The changes in the vacancy rate as
the talent pool increases from a size of 500 to 2000 are roughly equal for all three levels of
the judiciary.21
21There is more variation in the changes from 500 to 1000 and 1000 to 2000.
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Figure 3.16: This graph shows the average percentage of vacancies left open
based on the distance between the appointer’s ideal point and the status quo.
95% confidence intervals are plotted around the means.
The result for the distance between the proposer’s ideal point and the status quo is also
as expected. The farther away the proposer is from the status quo, the more vacancies that
he fills. Conversely, when the proposer is closer to the status quo, more vacancies are left
open.
Both of these results are consistent across each of the appointment based models. In each
model as the talent pool size increases, the vacancy rate decreases, as should be expected
because there are more people who can be appointed. Additionally, as the primary appointer
moves farther away from the status quo, the vacancy rate decreases, again as should be
expected because there are more judges who can pull the court in line with the appointer’s
ideal point.
Results: Promotions
The advise and consent model in Chapter 2 shows an increase in the percentage of
vacancies filled through promotion when the president is fully constrained. The reasons for
this increase in promotion rates are two fold. First, the Senate pays a cost for rejecting
75
qualified judges and current judges are, on average, better qualified. No such cost exists
in the voting body model. Second, by promoting, the president offers a compromise of
sorts. The president shifts the ideology of a higher court towards his ideal point at the cost
of shifting a lower court’s position away from his ideal point and towards the Senate’s. A
similar expectation holds in this model. Given that the median pays no cost to reject judges,
the only option available to the proposer to get the median’s vote is to offer a shift in a lower
court position. As a result, I expect that there will be higher promotion rates when the
proposer is constrained. The promotion results are in Figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.17: This graph shows the average proportion of vacancies filled
through promotions on the circuit and supreme courts for each level of con-
straint. 95% confidence intervals are plotted around the means.
Consistent with my expectation, there is an increase in the promotion rate when the
proposer is constrained. What is particularly interesting in this model is that when the
proposer is fully constrained, nearly all vacancies are filled through promotion. This result
makes sense in light of the incentives in place to get the median’s vote. The median pays
no cost for rejecting judges, so the proposer must offer a compromise in the location of the
courts, which he can do through promotion. The higher promotion rates when the proposer
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is constrained help to explain why the vacancy rate decreases and the qualifications increase
on higher courts over district courts when the proposer is constrained. Because the proposer
can ensure an improvement in the median’s overall payoff by yielding some leverage on a
lower court, the median will allow more appointments to these higher courts and the selected
judges will have higher qualifications as a result of their court experience.
The promotion rates are much higher when the proposer is fully constrained in this
model than in either of the other appointment based models. This is only true when the
proposer is fully constrained. In fact, for the supreme court, the promotion rates in this
model are indistinguishable from the promotion rates in the random assignment model when
the proposer is unconstrained or semi-constrained.22 This suggests that in systems with
legislative appointments there should be more promotions than in systems where judges are
appointed by a single actor or in advise and consent systems.
Elections
Many scholars of state courts are interested in how selection mechanisms affect judges’
behavior while on the bench (Caldarone, Canes-Wrone and Clark, 2009; Canes-Wrone, Clark
and Kelly, 2014; Gordon and Huber, 2007; Hall and Bonneau, 2008; Nelson, Caufield and
Martin, 2013). One of the main questions in this literature is how the behavior of elected
judges differs from appointed judges (Besley and Payne, 2013; Brace and Boyea, 2008; Canes-
Wrone, Clark and Kelly, 2014; Cann and Wilhelm, 2011; Choi, Gulati and Posner, 2011).
In this section, I build a model of judicial elections. This will allow me to see how the
judges that are selected through election differ from those judges who are appointed, both
in proximity to the public and the quality of the judges selected.
While there are a number of different types of elections that are utilized to select judges
on state courts, ranging from fully partisan to fully non-partisan to a mixture of the two
(Society, 2014; Canes-Wrone, Clark and Kelly, 2014; Nelson, Caufield and Martin, 2013), I
will only model partisan elections. This model is not meant to emulate the selection system
22Based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov comparisons of the distributions of promotion rates in the two models.
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in any one state. Rather, this model is meant to be used to consider how the judges selected
to the federal bench would differ if instead of being selected by the president, they were
elected much like the legislative and executive branches. As such, I assume that the judges
have life-time tenure, so there will not be a question of retention mechanism. This is both
computationally efficient, as it will only require a few judges to be selected in each round of
the model rather than the entire judiciary, and practical for answering my question, since
federal judges serve life tenures.
The model depicts a partisan election. There are two parties: for ease, I call them
Democrats and Republicans.23 It is the parties’ responsibility to put forward a slate of
judges to be selected by the public. I assume that the geographic requirement still exists,
so district judges will be selected by voters in their geographic region, circuit judges will
be selected by voters living in the circuit, and supreme court judges will be selected by all
voters. I use a median voter approach (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957), assuming that the party is
interested in attracting the median voter’s vote. Because the judges are selected by different
electorates, the median voter will differ for each court. I assume that the median voter is
located between the two parties’ ideal points. The ideal points for each of the median voters
are selected at random in each round.
While I assume the parties want to attract the median voter, I do not assume that there
will be complete convergence to the median voters’ ideal points. There are two reasons to
expect judges to be located away from the median voter’s ideal point. First, I assume that
the parties are nearly disjoint. The Democratic Party will have an ideal point in [-1,0] and
the Republican Party will have an ideal point in [0,1]. Each of the judges belong to a party
23I chose to model elections with only two parties, since that is the political landscape in the United
States. Because the purpose of this chapter is to consider how the federal judiciary would differ under
different selection mechanisms, it makes sense to model the elections as they would likely take place under
the current political landscape in the United States. I anticipate that if additional parties were introduced,
the results would be mostly consistent, with the parties more often constraining one another because the
ideological space would be occupied by more parties. Since this model is applicable beyond judicial selection,
but can also be applied to elections more broadly, in future work, I’d like to introduce more parties to see
how the components of the model change.
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and the parties will only put forward judges who are in their party. The ideal points of
judges belonging to each party are nearly disjoint. Judges are first assigned an ideal point in
[-1,1]. They then select their party. Judges whose ideal points are in [-1,-.1) are Democrats
and judges whose ideal points are in (.1,1] are Republicans. If a judge’s ideal point is in
[-.1,.1], a party is selected at random. Because of this near disjointedness, at times a median
voter will be close enough to one party that there is no judge that the other party could put
forward who the voter would prefer to a judge located at the first party’s ideal point, which
will limit convergence to the median voter’s ideal point.
Second, there will not be complete convergence to the median voter’s ideal point because
of the quality (or valence) dimension. When valence is included in a voting model, the
standard median voter results do not hold (Aragones and Palfrey, 2002; Carter and Patty,
Forthcoming; Groseclose, 2001; Stone and Simas, 2010). As a result, this added dimension
will ensure that there is not full convergence to the median voter’s ideal point because
the parties can select judges located nearer to their ideal points with high qualifications,
increasing the voter’s payoff.
Inherent in this model, I assume that parties and voters have different motivations and
concerns. The party is interested in moving as many courts as possible towards its ideal point.
Essentially, the party acts much like the president in the advise and consent model and the
appointer in the single appointer model. The difference is the constraint that the party faces.
I assume that the voters are unsophisticated and only concerned with selecting a judge who
gives them the highest payoff possible (based on the judge’s ideology and qualifications). As
a result, the parties will be interested in the big picture (how the judges change the overall
make-up of the judiciary), while the voters are interested in the individual contest of one
judge against another. As a result, the parties must select judges who will help their big
picture interest, under the constraint of who the voters prefer to whoever the other party
puts forward.
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The payoffs for both the parties and the voters are based on the judges’ or courts’ ideal
points and the qualifications (or valence) of the judges. As with the payoffs for the appointer
in the single appointer model, the president in the advise and consent model, and the actors
in the voting body model, the parties payoffs are determined by the distance of each court
in the judiciary from the party’s ideal point. The party also pays a cost for appointing low
quality judges. This can be considered essentially a loss in reputation for putting forward
low quality judges, since the voters would be less trusting of the party’s candidates in the
future if a low quality judge is elected to the bench from the party. The quality cost is paid
for each judge selected that is below the quality threshold for the level of the court. The
payoff function for the parties is below.
uPk = −
J∑
j=1
wlevel(j)(ctj − pk)2 −
N∑
i=1
ca,level(i)
(
1
qi
)
(3.3)
where pk is the ideal point for the kth party in p = {Democrat, Republican}. Each of the
other components of the payoff function are consistent with the explanations in the advise
and consent model.
I assume that voters are unsophisticated and do not consider the impact of their vot-
ing decisions. As a result, the voter chooses the judge who gives her the highest payoff.
Her payoffs are determined by the ideal point of the judge. The assumption that voters
incorporate their distance from the candidates into their payoff functions is well represented
in voting literature (Downs, 1957; Groseclose, 2001; Hotelling, 1929). While there may be
reason to question whether this would be true for judges if they were to be elected, there is
some literature to suggest that the public’s preferences over individual justices is driven by
how ideologically proximate they perceive the judge is from their own ideal point (Cameron,
Cover and Segal, 1990; Segal, Cameron and Cover, 1992). In addition, and consistent with
literature about the role of valence in voting decisions (Carter and Patty, Forthcoming;
Groseclose, 2001), I assume that voters receive positive utility based on the candidate’s
qualifications. Judicial politics literature also indicates that the public has an interest in
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judges’ qualifications (Cameron, Cover and Segal, 1990; Segal, Cameron and Cover, 1992;
Epstein et al., 2006). The voter’s payoff function is:
uVk = −(j − vk)2 + vb(qi) (3.4)
where vk is the median voter’s ideal point for k in v = {District 1, District 2, District
3, District 4, Circuit 1, Circuit 2, Supreme}, vb is the qualification, or valence, benefit
received, j is the candidate’s ideal point, and qi is the candidate’s qualifications. There will
be a different median voter for each court in the judiciary due to the geographic locations
of the courts. Consistent with the costs paid by the parties, I assume that the voter expects
judges appointed to each court to have a minimum level of qualifications. As a result, the
benefit, vb, is zero if the judge’s qualifications are below the court’s threshold and a positive
value if the judge’s qualifications are above the threshold. I assume that this benefit is
uniform across all levels of the judiciary while the threshold levels differ.
At the start of each round of the model, the ideal points of the parties and voters are
selected at random. Next, vacancies open randomly on the court. Once the vacancies are
realized, the selection of judges begins. Much like the advise and consent model, the parties’
selection of candidates is modeled using a modified matching model. The algorithm for
selecting judges proceeds as follows for each party:
1. The party determines the eligible set of judges for each election. The eligible judges
are all potential judges in the party who live in the court’s geographic region and all
judges in the party currently serving on lower courts in the geographic region. The
party only considers judges whose ideal points are located slightly more extreme than
the party position and just past the median voter’s ideal point.24 All potential judges
24I assume that the party does not want to appoint judges located farther from the party’s ideal point
than necessary. As a result, I restrict the judges considered in the algorithm to only judges located just
past the median voter’s position. If I were not to restrict the ideology of judges considered in this way, the
party might do worse by putting forward a judge whose ideology is located farther from the party’s ideal
point than is necessary due to the qualification benefit inherent in the voter’s payoff. I also include judges
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who are eligible for at least one election are compiled into one list and sorted based on
the judge’s ideological distance from the party position.
2. Starting with the judge located closest to the party’s position, the payoff is calculated
for placing the judge up for election for each position for which she is eligible.
3. The party starts by considering placing the judge up for election for the court that will
give the party the highest payoff. If the voter’s payoff for the judge is higher than the
highest payoff the voter will receive for any of the judges in the other party eligible
for that court, the judge is selected for election. If the judge is promoted from a lower
court, the judge is removed from that court for the purpose of calculating the party’s
ideal point for future steps in the matching process.25
4. If there is a judge in the other party who will give the voter a higher payoff, the judge
is considered for the court that gives the party the next highest payoff. The judge
is then considered against the judge from the other party eligible for the second best
court who gives the voter the highest payoff. If the judge in the first party gives the
voter a higher payoff than the judge in the second party, the judge is placed up for
election.
slightly more extreme than the party’s position because when the party and the median voter are located
close together, the range of ideal points considered must be wide enough to ensure that there are enough
judges to cover all elections and the judges who are more extreme than the party position are more proximate
than expanding the range even further past the median voter’s ideal point. I, in general, do not include
judge’s whose ideologies are more extreme than the appointer’s ideal point in the selection process because
some of the court locations are determined using means due to the decision rule for the court, and these
rules will tend to favor more extreme judges to pull the location of the court closer to the appointer’s ideal
point. Because the selection of judges who are more extreme than the selector is not seen often in practice, I
restrict the judges considered as near to the selector’s ideal point as possible to ensure these extreme judges
are not selected.
25In the other models, I then added this position to the positions to be filled on the lower court in that
round. Because of the nature of elections, in this model, this position will remain open until the next round
of the model and will be added to the vacancies to be filled in that round.
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5. Steps 3 and 4 repeat until the judge has been considered for each court for which she is
eligible and is either selected for a court or not chosen to any court because the other
party has a competitor.
6. The party moves on to the next closest judge.
7. Steps 3-6 repeat until either judges have been selected for all positions or all judges
have been considered.
8. If there are still positions without judges selected, the party selects the judges from
the set of eligible judges created in step 1 who give the voter the highest payoff.26,27
I assume that the party starts with positions higher in the judiciary first, because
the higher courts weigh more heavily in the party’s payoff function. This process of
choosing candidates for the remaining positions in the party’s election slate proceeds
as follows:
(a) The judges who have already been selected are removed from the set of eligible
judges.
26Because the judges are selected from each party based on whether there is a judge in the other party
who gives the voter a higher payoff, the judges who give the highest payoff must be selected in this step. If
the party were not to select the judge in their choice set who gives the voter the highest payoff, the other
party could select a judge located closer to its ideal point that gives the voter a lower payoff and makes the
other party worse off. To ensure that the other party will not do this, the party’s strategy must be to select
the judges who give the voter the highest payoff in the step.
27Because the selection set extends beyond the median voter’s ideal point, it is possible that the party
might be better off based on the distance between the selected judge and the party’s ideal point if a judge
from the other party is elected. This would occur if the judge that gives the median voter the highest payoff
from one party is located farther away from the party than a judge from the other party who gives the
median voter a slightly lower payoff. By having the party select the judge who gives itself the highest payoff
that also gives the median voter a payoff higher than any judge in the other party, I am assuming that the
party essentially receives some premium for winning that is larger than the loss in utility that would result
from selecting a judge that is located farther from the party’s ideal point than a judge from the other party.
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(b) Starting with the supreme court, the judges who give the median voter the kth
highest payoffs, with k being the number of positions on the supreme court that
do not already have a candidate, are selected.28
(c) The selected judges are removed from the set of eligible judges for the lower courts.
(d) Steps b and c are repeated for each circuit court.29
(e) Step b is repeated for each district court.30
9. With the judges selected from each party, the elections occur. The voter’s payoffs are
calculated for each judge up for election.
10. The judges who give the voter the top k payoffs are selected for each court, with k
being the number of vacancies on the court.31
The nature of elections presents a new challenge for analyzing the results of the model.
Because there are two sources of constraint - the other party and the median voter - I will
look at how the two levels of constraint affect the judges who are selected. The first is
constraint from the other party. Here, the party that is located closest to the median voter
has a clear advantage. As a result, a party is advantaged when it is closer to the median
voter and disadvantaged when the other party is closer to the median voter. The second level
of constraint comes from the median voter. In the same way the relationship between the
status quo, Senate, and president affect the judges selected in the advise and consent model,
28If there are no positions open that need a judge on this court, this step is skipped.
29If there are no positions open that need a judge on one of these courts, this step is skipped for that
court.
30If there are no positions open that need a judge on one of these courts, this step is skipped for that
court.
31Rather than placing the judges in one to one elections, I assume that each party presents a set of judges
and the voter selects the judges who give her the highest payoffs much like many state judicial elections
where the voters are given a set of judges and told to pick 2 or 3. The results would be the same if I were
to set the judges up against one another in head to head elections (because judges are only selected if they
beat all other possible judges from the other party).
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the same holds for the election model. I use the same formula for determining constraint as
the advise and consent model substituting the advantaged party’s ideology for the president’s
and the median voter’s ideology for the Senate’s.
Results: Ideology
Each of the appointment based mechanisms show that, in general, the primary appointer
is able to appoint judges near his ideal point with some differences across courts and when
the appointer faces constraint from other political actors. In this model, not only are there
two parties constraining one another, but there is also an elector who ultimately decides
who is selected. As a result, the parties should do less well in assigning judges close to their
ideal point than other political actors. However, one party should do better than the other.
The advantaged party, or the party closer to the median voter, should appoint more judges
located nearer to its ideal point than the disadvantaged party. The distance between the
selected judge and the respective party is shown in Figure 3.18.
As is evident from Figure 3.18, parties do much better when they are the advantaged
party.32 The elected judges are much closer to the party’s ideal point when the party is
closer to the median voter’s ideal point than when not. When the party is at a disadvantage
relative to the median voter’s ideal point, the ideologies of the judges elected from the party
are far from the party’s ideal point. In fact, the judges are farther from the disadvantaged
party’s ideal point than they would be if the judges were selected randomly. One difference in
this model is that there is not much difference between the different courts in the judiciary.
This is likely driven as a result of the payoffs for the voters. While the parties receive
higher payoffs for pulling the higher court’s ideologies in line with their own, the weight for
the ideology of the judge is uniform across all levels of the judiciary in the voter’s payoff.
Accordingly, while the parties want to move the higher courts closer to their ideal point, they
must still select judges who the voter prefers to judges put forward by the other party, who
will also have a higher incentive to have their judges win for the higher offices. Kolmogorov-
32These differences have been confirmed by Komogorov-Smirnov tests.
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Figure 3.18: This graph shows the density of the absolute distance between the
advantaged and disadvantaged parties’ ideal points and the ideal points of the
judges elected from those parties. The graphs across the rows correspond to
the appointments to each level of the judiciary: supreme, circuit, and district
courts. The scales for each of these graphs are identical.
Smirnov tests show that while there are differences in the ideologies of the judges selected to
different levels of the judiciary when selected from the advantaged party, the only differences
between levels for the judges selected from the disadvantaged party are between the district
and circuit courts.
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Next I consider how the median voter constrains the advantaged party. The graph of
the distance between the ideologies of the appointed judges and the advantaged party for
different levels of constraint from the median voter are in Figure 3.19.33
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Figure 3.19: This graph shows the density of the absolute distance between the
advantaged party’s ideal point and the ideal points of the appointed judges.
The graphs across the columns correspond to the level of constraint the party
faces from the median voter: unconstrained, semi-constrained, and fully con-
strained. The graphs across the rows correspond to the appointments to each
level of the judiciary: supreme, circuit, and district courts. The scales for each
of these graphs are identical.
33This result is unique to the advantaged party. The results for the disadvantaged party look the same
as the graphs in the right column in Figure 3.18 regardless of how constrained the party is by the median
voter. Even when unconstrained by the median voter, the judges elected from the disadvantaged party are
still not close to the party’s ideal point.
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Figure 3.19 shows that when the advantaged party is unconstrained by the median voter,
the judges selected are closest to the party’s ideal point.34 The judges selected are farther
from the advantaged party’s ideal point when the party is semi- or fully-constrained by the
median voter, but slightly closer when the party is semi-constrained. When the party is
unconstrained, the closest judges are selected to the supreme court.35 The judges that are
selected to the circuit and supreme courts are closer to the advantaged party than those
selected from the district courts when the party is semi-constrained, with no differences
between the circuit and supreme courts. There are no differences between judges selected to
the different levels when the party is fully constrained.
Given that elected judges are only close to a party’s ideal point when the party is ad-
vantaged and unconstrained, it seems that the driving determinant of the appointed judges’
ideologies is the median voter’s ideal point. This makes sense given that the median voter
gets the ultimate say as to who is selected and the parties are competing with one another
to bring the judges close to the median voter’s ideal point. This is in contrast to the results
of the other models, where the first mover has the advantage. Because of the nature of
election model, the voter has the advantage rather than the parties with the only advantage
for the parties lying in which party has an advantage over the other. Figure 3.20 shows the
distribution of the distance between the elected judges’ ideologies and the median voter’s
ideology broken down by the level to which the median voter constrains the advantaged
party. As expected, the ideologies of the elected judges are generally close to the median
voter’s ideal point. Additionally, this result holds for each level of the judiciary and each
level of constraint, with only minimal differences between the distributions of elected judges
34Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirm these differences.
35As confirmed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
88
for each of the nine graphs.36 Where there are differences, the voter does better when the
party is more constrained.
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Figure 3.20: This graph shows the density of the absolute distance between
the median voter’s ideal point and the ideal points of the elected judges. The
graphs across the columns correspond to the level of constraint the advantaged
party faces from the median voter: unconstrained, semi-constrained, and fully
constrained. The graphs across the rows correspond to the appointments to
each level of the judiciary: supreme, circuit, and district courts. The scales
for each of these graphs are identical.
The election model creates different incentives than we see in the appointment based
models. In both the advise and consent and voting body models, there is a first-mover ad-
vantage for the primary appointer. In the election model, we see a second-player advantage.
36These distributions do differ significantly based on Kolomogorov-Smirnov tests comparing the distribu-
tions.
89
While the advantaged party has a first-player advantage when unconstrained by the median
voter, in the presence of even a little bit of constraint, the median voter is the one who gets
judges near his or her ideal point. This might be encouraging to anyone concerned that
judges should represent the preferences of the public. The only way the judges would be
more representative of the public’s preferences in appointment based models is if the ide-
ologies of the elected officials were perfectly representative of the public’s preferences, since
the judges selected are closer to the appointer’s ideal point in each of those models than the
judges selected in the elections model are to the median voter.
Results: Qualifications
Given that the ideology results in this model are markedly different than the results of
other models, and given the prominence of the role of qualifications in the median voter’s
payoff function, I anticipate that the qualifications of the judges appointed in this model will
be higher than the qualifications of the judges selected through other selection mechanisms.
This should be particularly true when the elected judges come from the disadvantaged party
or when the advantaged party is constrained due to the location of the median voter and the
status quo. In each of these instances, the ideologies of the selected judges are farther away
from the party’s ideal point, indicating a more competitive electoral environment. When
the electoral environment is competitive, the parties have an incentive to put forward the
most qualified judges possible to maximize their chances of winning the election. Figure 3.21
shows the mean qualifications for the judges selected to each court when the judge who wins
the election is from the party with the advantage and when the judge who wins is from the
party with the disadvantage.
Consistent with my expectation, the overall qualifications of elected judges is quite high,
with the judges elected from the disadvantaged party having much higher qualification scores
than judges elected from the advantaged party. When a party is disadvantaged, the best
chance it has at winning is to select the best qualified judge possible. As a result, the judges
that the median voter prefers from the disadvantaged party will have high qualifications.
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Figure 3.21: This graph shows the average qualifications of elected judges to
each level of the judiciary from the advantaged and disadvantaged party. 95%
confidence intervals are plotted around the means.
Figure 3.22 shows the qualifications for the judges selected when the advantaged party
is unconstrained, semi-constrained, and fully constrained by the median voter. Consistent
with my expectations and the results for the ideologies of the elected judges, the qualifica-
tions of the elected judges increase as the advantaged party’s level of constraint increases.
There is a large difference in the qualifications of judges elected when the advantaged party
is semi- and fully-constrained over unconstrained. The qualifications continue to increase
as the advantaged party goes from semi-constrained to fully constrained, but the change is
more moderate. This is because the electoral environment becomes more competitive when
the advantaged party is semi- and fully-constrained. When the advantaged party is uncon-
strained, particularly if the median voter is outside the range of ideal points for judges in
the other party, the advantaged party can select any judge and the median voter will vote
for that judge. In contrast, when the advantaged party is either semi- or fully-constrained,
the disadvantaged party has a better opportunity to start pulling the ideal points of the
appointed judges towards the median voter’s ideal point by selecting highly qualified judges,
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which means that the advantaged party has to start choosing better qualified judges as well,
which limits the selection pool. This is consistent with the big changes in the ideology results
between no constraint and some level of constraint.
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Figure 3.22: This graph shows the average qualifications of elected judges to
each level of the judiciary given the level of constraint the advantaged party
faces from the median voter. 95% confidence intervals are plotted around the
means.
These results suggest that in elections based models, better qualified judges will be se-
lected. This suggests that elections emphasizing judge’s qualifications will yield well qualified
judges. To the extent that the valence dimension is better characterized as other features
of the candidate, such as personality or like-ability, this result may not translate to better
qualified judges.
Results: Vacancies
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One benefit that results from a system that elects judges is that all vacancies are filled.37
In the other models, the elite actors can choose to leave positions open if they cannot find
someone who will improve their payoff. For parties, this option is not available. If the party
decides not to place a judge up for election because the median voter will not vote for a
judge that will improve the party’s payoff, the median voter will just vote for a judge put
forward by the other party. If an election spot was left vacant, the other party would be
free to put forward any judge it wanted and the voter would have to vote for that judge.38
This judge would likely make the first party, the one who did not put forward a judge, worse
off than some judge within its own party who only slightly lowers the party’s payoff. As a
result, the very action of putting forward a candidate can improve the party’s overall payoff,
whether that candidate wins or loses, because it forces the other party to choose a more
moderate judge. Because of these incentives, candidates are selected from both parties for
each position that is open.
This stands in contrast to the vacancy rates that are seen in the appointment based
models. The nature of elections ensures that judges are selected to fill positions because
there are two competing parties who want to get judges on the bench. In contrast, in an
appointment based system where some appointer has the option not to appoint if they are
not made better off by doing so, vacancies will occur, and certain conditions will lead to
greater or fewer vacancies.
Results: Promotions
The final factor in this model is the rate of promotions. The other models have shown
that there is a link between qualifications and promotions and when elite actors are moti-
37Because judges that are elected from a different court (promoted) are not known until after the full
elections have taken place, the seats of the judges promoted to a higher court are open at the end of each
round of the model. These seats are added to the new openings to be filled in the next round. Because
vacancies and promotions are equivalent in this model, I will not discuss the vacancy rate. The decision to
leave positions open is not a strategic one in this model. Rather, the positions are left open due to factors
that influence the likelihood of promotion, which I will discuss next.
38This is assuming an election system with no write in possibilities.
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vated to choose highly qualified judges, they are often choosing from judges already in the
judiciary who have higher qualification scores on average. Figure 3.23 shows the promo-
tion rates for the elected judges chosen from the advantaged party and disadvantaged party.
Consistent with the results for qualifications, the promotion rates for judges selected from
the disadvantaged party are higher than the rates for judges selected from the advantaged
party. Consistent with the other models, promotion rates are higher on the supreme court
than the circuit courts. Again, this is likely due to a larger pool from which to promote and
the higher qualification threshold for judges on higher courts.
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Rate of Promotion
Constraint
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 V
ac
an
ci
es
 F
ill
ed
 T
hr
ou
gh
 P
ro
m
ot
io
n
Adv Disadv
Supreme
Circuit
Figure 3.23: This graph shows the average proportion of vacancies filled
through promotions on the circuit and supreme courts for judges selected from
the advantaged and disadvantaged party. 95% intervals are plotted around the
means.
Figure 3.24 shows the promotion rates when the advantaged party is unconstrained, semi-
constrained, and fully constrained by the median voter. Again, consistent with the results
for qualifications, there is a big increase in promotion rates when the advantaged party goes
from unconstrained to semi-constrained and a more moderate increase when the party goes
from semi-constrained to fully constrained (though the increase is larger here for circuit
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courts than the supreme court). Because the semi-constrained and fully constrained regimes
correspond to more competitive environments, where the valence dimension, or qualifications
of the judges, becomes more important, better qualified judges are chosen by the parties and
those judges are more likely to come from lower courts as these judges are generally better
qualified and come with added valence appeal.
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Figure 3.24: This graph shows the average proportion of vacancies filled
through promotions on the circuit and supreme courts for judges selected from
the advantaged party for each level of constraint faced by the median voter.
95% intervals are plotted around the means.
As with the voting body model, promotion rates are higher in the elections model than
in the advise and consent, single appointer, and random assignment models. The difference
here, is the added qualification benefit ensures that promotion rates are high even when
the advantaged party is unconstrained. The motivation for the promotion is different in
this model, however, than in the other models. In the advise and consent and voting body
models, promotion served as a compromise between the first and second actors or as a
tool to potentially punish the second actor. Here, there are more promotions because the
voters want to select the best qualified judges possible and since current judges have higher
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qualifications, there are more promotions within the judiciary. Indeed, the qualification and
promotion graphs look almost identical in this model, while there are distinct differences
between the graphs in the other models.
Discussion
The results of each of these models differ in key respects. The selection mechanism used
to select judges has a pronounced effect on the ideology and qualifications of the judges
selected, the rate of positions that are not filled, and the frequency with which positions
are filled by judges who are currently serving in the judiciary (promotions). There is no
one selection mechanism that is “best” and in considering selection mechanisms, drafters of
constitutions or other individuals responsible for choosing the selection mechanism for some
position must think about what they care about most.
The ideologies of the selected judges vary from near perfect alignment with the ideology of
the person responsible for selecting judges, to farther away when the appointer is constrained
by other actors, to no correlation with elite actors’ ideologies when judges are selected
randomly. If the parties responsible for determining the mechanism for selecting judges are
interested in ensuring the judges are representative of the public’s preferences, elections might
be the best system. Elections ensure that the judges are located near to the median voter’s
preferences. However, the judges selected under the advise and consent, single appointer,
and voting body models are not necessarily removed from the preferences of the public. If
the persons responsible for selecting judges are elected by the public, then the ideologies
of the appointed judges will likely still be fairly close in line with the public’s preferences.
Literature concerned about countermajoritarianism on the Supreme Court has shown that
turnover on the Court can ensure that the preferences represented on the Court stay in line
with the preferences of the public (Dahl, 1957; Norpoth and Segal, 1994; Segal and Spaeth,
2002). Of course, the judges selected under random assignment might be representative of
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the public’s preferences as well. Because of the random nature of the selection of the judges,
the ideologies on the courts are representative of the public more generally, rather than just
the median member of the public as is the case in mechanisms that rely on elections to keep
judges in line with the public. In contrast, if the parties responsible for determining the
mechanism for selecting judges are interested in ensuring that ideologies of the judges are
representative of the elite actors in the political system, the single appointer, advise and
consent, and voting body models would be best.
The qualifications of the judges selected also vary across models. The qualifications
range from very low in the random assignment model, to meeting a minimum threshold in
the single appointer model, to much higher under models where the primary appointer is
constrained as in the advise and consent, voting body, and elections models. In the single
appointer model, the judge’s qualifications are low and just above the threshold for the
particular court. In the advise and consent model, the element of constraint ensures better
qualified judges at the cost of distance from the primary appointer’s ideal point. The voting
body model encourages promotions when the proposer is constrained, which leads to higher
qualifications at least for higher courts. The highest qualifications occur under the elections
model where the added valence component in the voter’s payoff function ensures that better
qualified judges are selected at the cost of the proximity of the ideology of selected judges
to the primary appointer’s (parties) ideal points. All of these structured mechanisms differ
from a system using random assignment, where the qualifications of the selected judges is
quite low.
One of the more normatively interesting components of the model is the vacancy rate
resulting from each selection mechanism. The vacancy rate ranges from all vacancies filled
in the random assignment and election models, to higher vacancies in models where the
judges are selected by elite actors. High vacancy rates are a problem in the federal judiciary,
which has lead to a literature attempting to understand why some vacancies are filled more
quickly than others (Binder and Maltzman, 2004; Massie, Hansford and Songer, 2004; Shipan
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and Allen, 2011). In selecting a mechanism, this component must be weighed against the
ideology and qualifications of the selected judges. There is greater control over the ideology
of the selected judges in an appointment based mechanism such as the voting body, single
appointer, and advise and consent models. While at least two of these mechanisms, voting
body and advise and consent, come with higher qualifications, each of these mechanisms
also come with a higher vacancy rate. The elections model ensures that all vacancies are
filled while still selecting qualified judges at the cost of less control over the ideologies of
the judges, with the ideologies being centered around the median voters’ ideal points. The
random assignment model also comes with all vacancies being filled, but at the cost of no
control over the ideologies of the judges and low qualifications for the selected judges.
Finally, promotions vary across the four models and with it an emphasis on judicial
expertise and qualifications. The promotion rate varies from being equal to the portion of
the talent pool that is made up of current judges to slightly higher in the single appointer
model to higher rates in the advise and consent and elections models to nearly all vacancies
being filled by promotions when the promoter in the voting body model is constrained.
Again, this comes with trade-offs for the appointer. When the appointer fills a vacancy
through promotion he moves the location of the higher court and the lower court, which
yields a slight decrease in the overall payoff over what it would be if a similar judge not
serving in the judiciary were selected. The trade-off here is judges with higher qualifications
are selected when judges are promoted, which helps to ensure confirmation by the extra
actors in the model.
This paper shows the trade-offs that are inherent in the type of selection mechanism
used to select judges or agents. One topic in the state court literature considers how selec-
tion mechanisms affect judicial behavior (Caldarone, Canes-Wrone and Clark, 2009; Canes-
Wrone, Clark and Kelly, 2014; Gordon and Huber, 2007; Hall and Bonneau, 2008; Nelson,
Caufield and Martin, 2013). This paper shows that these differences start with the mecha-
nisms themselves and the judges that result from them. In choosing a mechanism for selecting
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judges, trade-offs must be weighed. These trade-offs include ability to select ideological al-
lies, the quality of judges selected, and the vacancy rates resulting from each mechanism.
The selection of a mechanism is not a benign one. Rather, this decision greatly affects each
of these dimensions. There is not one mechanism that is “best”, rather the best mechanism
can only be determined based on what is most important to the society it represents.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Tests of Federal
Appointments
The judiciary relies on the President’s nominations and the Senate’s confirmation
process to fill judicial vacancies; ... Over many years, however, a persistent
problem has developed in the process of filling judicial vacancies. - Chief Justice,
John Roberts, 2010, 7)
The persistent problem that John Roberts emphasizes in the quote above is the growing
number of vacancies in the United States Federal Judiciary. Through his appointments to the
judiciary, the president has the ability to make an impact that lasts long beyond his tenure in
office. However, persistent vacancies has been the norm for a number of years with vacancies
in the judiciary ranging from about 3% of all judgeships to around 11%. As the parties have
become more polarized in the Senate, and divided government has become a more frequent
reality, gridlock in filling judicial vacancies has risen at the cost of overburdening courts.
Indeed, it is this division between the parties that is often blamed for the persistence of
judicial vacancies. The very next line in Roberts’s report is “[e]ach political party has found
it easy to turn on a dime from decrying to defending the blocking of judicial nominations,
depending on their changing political fortunes” (Roberts 2010, 7). What exactly does this
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process of blocking judicial nominations look like and might there be more to these enduring
vacancies than simply political preference divergence? What role do other vacancies in the
judiciary play in each appointment decision and how does the distribution of vacancies in the
judiciary affect appointment decisions? This question of why vacancies persist is just one of
many questions that previous literature analyzing judicial appointments has been limited in
answering because appointment decisions have been treated independently.
In Chapter 2, I created a model that addressed the interdependence of vacancies in
the judiciary. The model predicts the portfolio of judges that the president chooses to fill
positions within the judiciary given constraint both from the Senate and from a finite pool
of potential judges from which to appoint. The model produced a number of predictions
about what types of judges are selected for which types of positions as well as how those
predictions change as the political environment changes. In this chapter, I will focus on the
predictions from the model about when to expect delay in the president’s nominations along
with when to expect positions to be filled through promotion as opposed to new judges being
selected.
The literature has remained mostly silent about promotion within the judiciary. A few
articles look at the features of judges that make them more or less likely to be promoted
(Black and Owens, 2012; Epstein, Landes and Posner, 2013; Savchak et al., 2006), yet no
scholarly work has looked at whether promotion is more likely in certain political environ-
ments. Ex ante, it is not clear why promotions should ever occur, especially if the president
already appears to have difficulty filling vacant positions in the judiciary. A promotion fills
an immediate vacancy, but at the cost of creating an additional vacancy to fill. In this
chapter, I provide the first theoretical rationale for why promotions might occur and when
and present the first empirical test about the factors that make promotions more likely.
In the next section, I begin with a brief review of the literature looking at vacancies
and promotions. In the section that follows, I provide a brief review of the results from the
model in Chapter 2, focusing on the new hypotheses that are generated about vacancies and
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promotions. I then empirically test these new predictions and conclude with thoughts about
future research directions.
Judicial Vacancies and Promotions
Much of the literature looking at judicial appointments focuses on the easy to quantify
aspects of the process (Epstein and Segal, 2005; Epstein et al., 2006; Martinek, Kemper and
Van Winkle, 2002; Segal, 1987; Segal, Cameron and Cover, 1992). These articles primarily
examine the Senate’s confirmation decisions including both delay in confirmation and final
passage votes. A much more understudied aspect of the process is the selection stage itself.
This in large part has to do with difficulty in gathering data relevant to selection decisions,
primarily who was considered but not selected. However, two aspects of selection have
received some scholarly attention in the empirical literature: when a nominee is selected and
when judges are promoted within the judiciary.
An easy to quantify aspect of selection is the timing in which a nomination is made.
At times the president fills vacancies swiftly; even sometimes nominating successors before
the judge leaving the position has officially left the court. Other times, the president allows
vacancies to remain unfilled for extended periods of time and for some positions, the president
neglects to nominate anyone before leaving office. This diversity in time to nomination has
prompted some scholars to investigate the causes for some vacancies being filled right away
and other vacancies remaining open for months or years. These articles have found that
politics plays some role in the timing of nominations (Binder and Maltzman, 2004; Massie,
Hansford and Songer, 2004; Shipan and Allen, 2011). Particularly, scholars have found that
the presence of a home state Senator who might block the president’s nomination plays a
key role in determining when there will be delay in filling vacancies (Binder and Maltzman,
2004; Massie, Hansford and Songer, 2004).1 Other factors also play a role in the timing of
1In Massie, Hansford and Songer (2004), they find this effect for district court vacancies only.
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nominations including the time remaining in the president’s term, the number of vacancies
that have opened in the congressional session, time remaining in the congressional session,
why the judgeship became vacant, and characteristics of the judge including race and gender.
The predictions from the model in Chapter 2 are in line with the result that politics plays
some role in delay in nomination decisions and also suggest an additional factor plays a key
role: the number of vacancies that roll over from one time period to the next (or the backlog
of vacancies).
Scholars have also examined the factors that contribute to promotion decisions (Black
and Owens, 2012; Bratton and Spill, 2003; Epstein, Landes and Posner, 2013; Savchak et al.,
2006). One of the primary difficulties in studying who is appointed to the judiciary is
compiling a selection pool of possible judges who could be, but are not, appointed to a court.
When looking at promotions, a clear pool exists: members of lower courts. This has given
scholars some leverage to look at who is selected to fill positions in the judiciary. Scholars
have examined what makes certain judges more likely to be promoted from district to circuit
courts (Savchak et al., 2006), what judges can do to make their own promotion more likely
(Epstein, Landes and Posner, 2013; Black and Owens, 2012), and what makes judges from
state supreme courts more likely to be selected for the federal judiciary (Bratton and Spill,
2003). In the first category, Savchak et al. (2006) find that presidential compatibility with a
judge’s record, the judge’s qualifications, and whether the departing judge is from the same
state as the district court judge make it more likely that the judge will be promoted, while
the distance between the president and the home state Senator, the number of other judges
in the president’s party in the same state or circuit, the judge’s age and seniority, and the
number of vacancies on the circuit court previously while the judge was in office all decrease
the likelihood that the judge will be promoted. Many of these findings are consistent with the
predictions of the model from Chapter 2: the president’s choice set and the judge’s ideology
and qualifications affect the president’s decision to promote. Furthermore, the model from
Chapter 2 can explain one of the additional findings from Savchak et al. (2006) that goes
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against the authors’ hypotheses: promotion of a judge is less likely when the president
is unconstrained. In the second category of articles looking at promotion decisions, what
judges can do to make promotion more likely, Black and Owens (2012) show that judges on
circuit courts tend to decide cases more in line with the president’s ideology and make their
opinions known by publishing their opinions and/or writing additional opinions when there
is a Supreme Court vacancy and they are on the president’s short list. Epstein, Landes and
Posner (2013) find similar behavior: that some judges “audition” for promotion. They find
this behavior for both circuit court judges wishing to be elevated to the Supreme Court and
district court judges wishing to be promoted to the Courts of Appeals.
However, no scholarly work has examined whether there are certain instances under
which promotion is more likely in general. It is well known that many Supreme Court
vacancies are filled through promotion, while far fewer circuit court positions are filled in
this way. Since 1981, 80% of nominations to the Supreme Court have been promotions
within the judiciary.2 On circuit courts, only about 30% of nominations are promotions
in the same time frame. Is there something about the nomination or confirmation process
for the Supreme Court that makes promotion more likely than to circuit courts? There is
no formal difference between the two with regard to process. Each type of appointment is
governed by the “advice and consent” detailed in Article II of the United States Constitution.
One possibility is that promotion is more likely because judges who are already on a court
are better qualified and given previous literature that suggests an interplay between ideology
and qualifications (Binder and Maltzman, 2009; Epstein and Segal, 2005; Epstein et al., 2006;
Martinek, Kemper and Van Winkle, 2002; Segal, 1987; Segal, Cameron and Cover, 1992),
the president fills these vacancies through promotion because these types of judges are less
likely to be rejected. If this is true, might it be the case that other factors that contribute
to a more difficult confirmation process also contribute to more promotions?
2This includes nominations that were withdrawn or did not pass through the Senate. If just considering
the appointment of justices (justices that are confirmed by the Senate), 10 out of the last 12 appointments
have been promotions.
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In the next section, I review the results of the model from Chapter 2 pertaining to when
vacancies are filled through promotion or not at all, generating the hypotheses that I will
test in this chapter.
Hypotheses
The results from the model that I discuss below come from the approximately 67,000
matched appointments from simulations of the model in Chapter 2. Below, I revisit the
results of the model that pertain to the vacancy rate and promotions within the judiciary to
develop the hypotheses that will be tested in the next section.
Vacancies
The model provides testable hypotheses about how often the president leaves vacancies
open (because he cannot improve his payoff by appointing additional judges). Previous liter-
ature has never explicitly modeled when to anticipate vacancies to build up in the judiciary.
Rather, the literature has focused on delay in nominations. Because the model uses discrete
time periods, when vacancies are unfilled, they carry over to the next year. This is tanta-
mount to the president delaying the nomination choice. Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of
vacancies left open when the president is constrained and when he is unconstrained.3 Previ-
ous literature has found that as the relationship between the president and key players in the
Senate changes, the amount of delay to expect also changes (Binder and Maltzman, 2004;
Massie, Hansford and Songer, 2004; Shipan and Allen, 2011). To capture this, I categorize
whether the president is constrained or unconstrained. The president is constrained when
he and the Senate are on opposite sides of the court’s status quo location (the location of
3To calculate this statistic, I include only those vacancies left open when there is at least one vacancy to
be filled as measured by the sum of vacancies unfilled in the last iteration, the number of vacancies that open
in the current iteration, and the number of promotions that occur in the current iteration that create new
vacancies to be filled. The data points used to create this graph are calculated as the average percentage of
unfilled positions for each court/constraint pairing. 95% confidence intervals are graphed around the means.
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the court if no appointments are made) and unconstrained when they are on the same side
of the court.
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
Rate of Unfilled Vacancies
Constraint
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 V
ac
an
ci
es
 N
ot
 F
ill
ed
Unconstrained Constrained
Supreme
Circuit
District
Figure 4.1: Vacancy rate. The y-axis measures the percentage of vacancies
that are still open at the end of each round of the model. The x-axis measures
the level of constraint the president faces (either unconstrained or constrained).
This graph suggests that there is an increase in the frequency with which positions are
left open in the judiciary when the president is constrained. This effect is largest for the
supreme court, but the difference is significant for all levels of the judiciary.
• Hypothesis 1: When the president is constrained by the Senate, there will be greater
delay in filling vacancies.
This constraint result, however, still leaves some question as to why vacancies persist.
The difference between unconstrained and constrained presidents is not overly compelling,
particularly for the lower courts where the greatest delay often occurs. The results in Chapter
2 indicate that the number of vacancies that the president has to fill, or the workload that
he faces, contributes to the vacancy rate. Figure 4.2 shows how the number of “inherited”
vacancies, or vacancies that carried over from the previous round, affects the president’s
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Figure 4.2: Vacancy rate. The y-axis measures the predicted proportion of
unfilled vacancies. The x-axis measures the number of vacancies that carry
over from the previous round.
ability to fill vacancies in the current round. Figure 4.2 was created using predictions from a
logistic regression of the percentage of vacancies left open in each round of the model on the
number of “inherited” vacancies, whether it is the President’s first year, and an interaction
between the two. The predictions from the model are graphed for each possible value of
“inherited” vacancies for new and continuing presidents. 95% confidence intervals are shown
around the predictions.
This figure suggests that the presence of “inherited” vacancies, or the backlog the pres-
ident faces, also affects when vacancies are filled. Figure 4.2 shows that as the number of
“inherited” vacancies increases, the proportion of vacancies that are left open also increases.
• Hypothesis 2: As the number of vacancies the president “inherits” from a previous time
period increases, there will be greater delay in filling vacancies.
Figure 4.2 also shows that this effect differs between new and continuing presidents. The
effect is much larger for continuing presidents than new presidents. Additionally, this graph
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shows that there is a difference between new and continuing presidents in general. New
presidents leave fewer vacancies open than continuing presidents. This difference suggests
an interactive effect between new presidents and inherited vacancies.
• Hypothesis 3: The effect of “inherited” vacancies will be smaller for new presidents
than continuing presidents.
• Hypothesis 4: New presidents will be less likely to delay filling vacancies than continuing
presidents.
A final factor that affects the rate of vacancies is the distance between the president and
the court’s status quo location.4 When the president is farther away from the court, he
leaves fewer vacancies open. Figure 4.3 shows how the vacancy rate changes as the president
moves farther from the status quo.5 This result is straightforward; when the president is
farther away from the court, appointing more judges will move the court closer, but when
he is relatively close to the court, there is likely some point at which appointing more judges
will not improve the location of the court, so he leaves vacancies open.
• Hypothesis 5: As the distance between the president and the court’s position increases,
vacancies will be filled more quickly.
Promotions
The model also predicts when the president is more likely to promote within the judiciary
versus filling vacancies with new talent. The results of the model suggest that there are
certain instances under which promotions are more likely. Figure 4.4 shows the percentage
4The court location before any appointments are made.
5For each point on this graph, the vacancy rate is equal to the average number of vacancies open when
the distance between the president and the status quo is between the value at that point and .1 plus that
value.
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Figure 4.3: Vacancy rate. The y-axis measures the percentage of vacancies
that are still open at the end of each round of the model. The x-axis measures
the distance between the president and the status quo.
of vacancies that are filled through promotion on the circuit courts and the supreme court
for three levels of constraint.6 For a review of how this is measured, refer to Chapter 2.
This graph suggests two new hypotheses that have been previously untested. First,
promotions are more likely, in general, to the supreme court than they are to circuit courts.
This result makes sense if for no other reason than the fact that there are more people to
promote to the supreme court. Additionally, the thresholds for the qualification costs are
higher for the supreme court, and because judges already serving on courts have higher
qualifications, promotion is more likely to the supreme court.
• Hypothesis 6: Promotions are more likely to the Supreme Court than to circuit courts.
The promotion rates also change based on the president’s level of constraint. For both the
circuit and supreme courts, the president promotes more often when he is fully constrained
6This graph only shows the promotion rate when there is at least one position to fill on the court. The
data points used to create this graph are the average values for each court/constraint combination. 95%
confidence intervals are graphed around the means.
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of vacancies filled through promotion. The y-axis mea-
sures the percentage of vacancies that are filled through promotion. The x-axis
measures the level of constraint the president faces from the Senate, with the
president being either unconstrained (none), semi-constrained (semi), or fully-
constrained (fully).
over when he is unconstrained or semi-constrained. As a result, I anticipate that the president
will be more likely to promote when he is facing a fully constrained regime.
From Chapter 2, there are two reasons to expect more promotions as the president
becomes more constrained: the leveraging of better qualified judges for more ideologically
proximate judges and the shift of a lower court towards the Senate. As a result, promotions
appear to be a tool that is utilized when the president is constrained to help get judges
confirmed by the Senate.
• Hypothesis 7: When the president is fully constrained, vacancies are more likely to be
filled through promotion.
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Data and Methods
To test these seven hypotheses, I use and extend the Lower Federal Court Confirmation
Database (Martinek, 2000). I extend the database through 2008 for lower court vacancies
and include all Supreme Court vacancies from 1977-2008. The dataset includes one obser-
vation for each nomination opportunity. A nomination opportunity can start in one of four
ways. Either the judge leaves office,7 a previous nomination is returned to the president by
the Senate, either a nominee or the president withdraws a previous nomination, or a new
president assumes office. A single vacancy might have multiple nomination opportunities; a
nomination opportunity exists whenever a position is vacant without a nominee pending. A
nomination opportunity ends with either a nomination or when the president leaves office if
no nomination attempt is made. The start and end dates of each nomination opportunity are
recorded in the database. The length to nomination is counted in months. From 1977-2008,
there are 2,189 nomination opportunities.
Vacancies
There are five hypotheses that pertain to when vacancies will remain open in the judiciary.
Because the model from which these hypotheses are derived uses discrete time intervals, when
a vacancy is not filled it carries over to the next year to be filled in that round, or again,
to remain unfilled. This type of action is delay in decision making. Previous literature
has looked at delay in filling vacancies using duration models to estimate when vacancies
will be filled (Binder and Maltzman, 2004; Massie, Hansford and Songer, 2004; Shipan and
Allen, 2011). Following previous literature, the dependent variable that I focus on is time
to nomination. This is measured as the time between when a nomination opportunity first
opens and a nomination is made to fill the vacancy.
7A judge can leave office through resignation, retirement, death, promotion, or by assuming senior status.
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The unit of analysis is at the nomination opportunity-month level. To test Hypotheses
1-5, I use a hierarchical discrete time duration model. I use this model rather than a Cox
Proportional Hazard Model or Weibull model for two reasons. First, because I am testing
hypotheses that derive from a model that uses discrete time periods, a discrete duration
model will allow me to more closely test these hypotheses. Second, many of my covariates
are time-varying, but most of them only change monthly, yearly, or per congressional session.
As a result, aggregating to a monthly time estimate makes practical sense. Because this time
measure is discrete rather than continuous, other duration models are inappropriate, and
instead a discrete model is the most appropriate model to use (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones,
2004). When estimating a duration model, it is necessary to choose a parametrization for the
effect of time on the hazard rate. There are a number of options available for parametrizing
this time effect. I use a quadratic form for the duration effect. I chose this parametrization
because while it makes sense that vacancies are more likely to be filled in each passing
month that they are open, if they have not already been filled, observations in the data set
can be right-censored due to presidents leaving office and nomination opportunities ending
without a nomination. This means that if vacancies have been open for a particularly long
time, it might be less likely that they will be filled because the president is running out of
time to fill the vacancy. This type of duration dependence lines up well with a quadratic
parametrization for the duration dependence on the hazard rate.8
The outcome variable is binary; the outcome is equal to 1 if the nomination opportunity
ends in a particular month, and 0 otherwise. There is both left and right censoring in
the data. It is possible for nomination opportunities to close before they open, or before
8As robustness checks, I estimate the model using other parameterizations. The additional parameteriza-
tions I estimate include a linear effect, a logistic effect, fixed effects for each time period, and a conditional
logit. Following Carter and Signorino (2010), who suggest a cubic parametrization may be the best ap-
proach, I attempted this parametrization as well. This model proved too taxing on the data and did not
reach convergence. However, Carter and Signorino (2010) suggest that any polynomial approach is beneficial,
but choose the cubic to find a balance between capturing the correct hazard shape without overfitting. The
quadratic approach that I take in this chapter seems sufficient to control for this effect. The results of the
models I present are largely robust to other parameterizations of this duration dependence. I make note of
any results that differ for different parameterizations of the duration dependence.
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the person vacating the position has left. For these left-censored observations, the outcome
variable is equal to 1 in the month that it is opened.9 The outcome variable for right-censored
observations, or nomination opportunities that do not end in nomination, is 0 for every month
the opportunity is open. Because the outcome is binary, standard models that are suited
to handle binary outcome variables can be used to estimate this model (Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones, 2004). I estimate a hierarchical logistic regression model with random intercepts
for each nomination opportunity and for each president. I include these random intercepts
because errors are likely to be correlated within each of these two groups, and including
random intercepts in the model will mitigate the effects of correlated errors. The coefficients
in the model measure the effect on the hazard rate. In other words, positive coefficients
indicate that increases in the variable lead to increases in the hazard rate, or the likelihood
that the nomination will end in that month. Negative coefficients indicate that an increase
in the variable leads to a decrease in the hazard rate.
The primary variables of interest are the level of the court, Court, the number of “inher-
ited” vacancies, or vacancies that carried over to the current month, Inherited Vacancies, the
president’s distance from the status quo, |P-Q|, and the relationships between the Senate,
the president, and the status quo.
The model does not produce clean predictions about the differences between levels of
the judiciary with regard to how often vacancies are left unfilled. However, there are likely
differences in the duration of vacancies between the levels of the judiciary in the actual data.
To control for these differences, I include a variable that measures the level of the judiciary
for each vacancy. This court level variable is categorical. Nomination opportunities are
either to the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, or district courts.
The model predicts that when there are inherited vacancies, there will be delay in filling
positions. I measure vacancies as the number of vacant positions open in the court’s geo-
9Because the model is discrete, this means that left-censored observations are treated as equivalent to
observations that are filled within the first month they have opened.
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graphic area. For district courts, this is all vacancies within the district, other vacancies in
the state the district is located in, all vacancies on the circuit court where the district’s cases
are appealed, and all vacancies on the Supreme Court.10 For circuit courts, this is measured
as all vacancies on the circuit court, all vacancies on the district courts in the circuit, and
all vacancies on the Supreme Court. For the Supreme Court, this is measured as all open
vacancies. I use the vacancies in the geographic region rather than just vacancies on the
court, because the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 suggests that the president’s
behavior with regard to one vacancy is related to his behavior with respect to other va-
cancies. Geographic regions measure overlapping choice sets. The same judges or potential
judges can be appointed to any district in, and the corresponding circuit for, the state in
which they live as well as the Supreme Court. As a result, the number of vacancies in the
court’s geographic region likely has a greater effect on whether vacancies are filled on that
court than just the vacancies on the individual court. To get a measure of the inherited va-
cancies, or the vacancies that carried over to the current month, I measure all vacancies that
were open, but not filled, in the previous month. I expect a negative relationship between
inherited vacancies and the hazard rate for nomination.
The theoretical model also predicts that the effect of inherited vacancies will differ for new
presidents. To estimate this relationship, I include an interaction between new presidents
and inherited vacancies. The matching model in Chapter 2 assumes complete and perfect
information about the talent pool; that the president enters office already knowing the
complete pool of potential judges. In reality, this is likely not the case, and the first few
months of a new presidency might consist of compiling a list of potential judges who could
be appointed to fill vacancies within the judiciary. The model also assumes the president’s
only task is to fill vacancies in the judiciary. Given that the actual first year of a presidency
is filled with many important duties such as making cabinet and other high level executive
10I include all vacancies open in the state where the district is located rather than just the district itself,
because judges can be appointed to any vacancy open in the state where they live (Giles, Hettinger and
Peppers, 2001).
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appointments and often the president has some agenda that he would like to complete during
his honeymoon period (the first one hundred days the president is in office), it is likely that
at for least the first few months of the first year, few vacancies in the judiciary will be filled,
contrary to what the model suggests. However, once the president is situated and can focus
on judicial appointments, the model’s expectations about new presidents should hold. The
first year in the model might better be interpreted as the first attention paid to judicial
vacancies. To approximate this freshman, or first attention, effect, I code the variable, New
President as 1 for the second half of the president’s first year, and 0 otherwise.11 I expect
positive effects for both New President and the interaction between New President and
Inherited Vacancies.12
To measure the president’s distance from the status quo, I use Judicial Common Space
Scores (Epstein et al., 2007) and Federal District Court Judge Ideology Data (Boyd, 2010).
I calculate this distance for each month the opportunity is open. To measure the court’s
location, I use the same procedure I use in the model in Chapter 2, which is to base the court’s
location on its decision rule. For district courts, I use the mean ideology score for judges on
the court.13 For the circuit courts, I create all possible permutations of three judges, take
11There might be a trichotomous effect and a separate variable should be included for the first sixth months
of the president’s time in office, since he would be less likely to nominate judges in this time frame. Because I
want to know if the president fills vacancies more quickly in the first period in which he pays attention to the
vacant positions, I am only interested in the dichotomous effect of new presidents (or the latter six months
of the president’s first year) and how that differs from the rest of his presidency. To check the effect of a
trichotomous variable, with a separate indicator for the first sixth months of the first year, I have estimated
the model including a variable for the first sixth months, First Six, and an interaction between this variable
and the number of inherited vacancies. The results are robust to including these additional variables. The
coefficient for First Six is negative and statistically significant. In the model with the trichotomous indicator,
the interaction between New President and Inherited Vacancies is statistically significant and negative.
12I expect a positive interactive effect because the expected direction for inherited vacancies is negative.
Because the theoretical model predicts a smaller relationship between vacancies and duration to nomination
for new presidents, I expect a positive interactive effect, which would make a smaller negative marginal effect
for vacancies under new presidents than continuing presidents.
13There was one nomination opportunity to the District of New Hampshire and two opportunities to the
Eastern District of Washington for which there was at least one month with no status quo score because there
were no judges on the court in those month(s). All observations for these three nomination opportunities
were removed from the dataset.
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the medians of those three judge panels, and calculate the mean of all medians.14 For the
Supreme Court, I take the median of all justices on the court. For circuit and district courts,
judges can choose to take senior status, in which they are still deciding cases, though not
to the same degree, and their position becomes open to be filled. Because these judges are
still in the pool to decide cases, I include all senior judges in the status quo scores.15 One of
the primary reasons I chose to keep senior judges in the courts’ ideology scores is that there
are numerous observations for vacancies to district courts for which the only judges in the
district are senior judges. By including senior judges in the court scores, I am able to keep
these observations in the dataset. The distance between the president and the status quo
is measured as the absolute distance between the court score and the president’s ideology
score.
To measure the relationships between the Senate, the president, and the court’s prefer-
ences, Constraint, I use the same approach that I use in the discussion of the model results.
If the president is constrained, if he is on the opposite side of the court from the Senate, this
variable is coded as a 1 and 0 otherwise. As another measure of the political environment,
I use the distance between the president and the Senate, Elite Distance. Previous literature
has pointed to a number of pivotal members in the Senate that might act as a constraint
on the president’s actions (Aldrich and Rohde, 2000; Cox and McCubbins, 2007; Krehbiel,
1998; Primo, Binder and Maltzman, 2008). For this test, I use the ideology of the blue slip
Senator.16 I do so because prior literature points to the importance of the ideologies of the
home state Senators in appointment decisions (Binder and Maltzman, 2004; Massie, Hans-
ford and Songer, 2004). The blue slip ideology is measured using blue slip threat. Following
14When there were fewer than three judges on the court, I took the median of the judges on the court.
15I also calculate the status quo without these senior judges. Where the results differ when using the two
scores, I note so in the discussion of the results.
16Note this is different than the approach taken in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, I assumed that the blue slip
process was not at work. However, I anticipate that to the extent that the blue slip process plays a role, it
would only strengthen the results. As a result, I still anticipate that I will find the same results I find in the
model using the blue slip Senator’s score.
116
Binder and Maltzman (2004), I code blue slip threat as a 1 if one or more of the Senators
from the state are more than one standard deviation removed from the president’s ideology
(using the standard deviation of ideology scores in the Senate) and a 0 if neither Senator
from the state is more than one standard deviation from the president’s ideology. If both
Senators are more than one standard deviation away, the blue slip ideology is measured as
the mean of their ideology scores, if only one Senator poses a threat, the ideology measure
is equal to that Senator’s ideology, and if neither Senator presents a blue slip threat, the
score is equal to the president’s ideology.17 Other potential constraining ideologies are the
median member of the Senate, the filibuster pivot, a senatorial courtesy score, the judiciary
committee median, and the judiciary committee chair. The results using these ideologies
differ from the results using the blue slip senator’s ideology, but only for the ideology result.
The results using each of these ideologies are presented in different models in Appendix B
in Chapter 6.
In addition to the variables of interest, I code a number of variables that previous liter-
ature suggests are important for the president’s decision to fill a vacancy swiftly or to delay
in filling the vacancy (Binder and Maltzman, 2004; Massie, Hansford and Songer, 2004). I
code the time remaining in the president’s term, Time President, measured in months. I
also code whether the president is in his second term, Second Term. The president’s ap-
proval rating may also affect the timing until nomination. I code the approval rating in
the month, Approval, using information from The American Presidency Project (Peters and
Wooley, 2013). I use the president job approval data, which comes from Gallup. For months
with multiple polling observations, I take the mean of all polls conducted in the month. If
there is no polling data for a particular month, I use the mean of polls conducted in the
17For circuit courts, because the president has some discretion when it comes to selecting judges, which
might allow him to potentially avoid selecting a judge from a state where a blue slip is likely, the blue slip
score is equal to the score that is closest to the president’s ideology from the states in the circuit. For
Supreme Court appointments, and all other courts for which there are no geographic restrictions, or where
nominees are likely to come from a geographic region for which there is no representation in the Senate,
such as courts in the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico, the blue slip Senator score is always equal to the
President’s ideology score.
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month before and after the missing month. If there is no polling data for the first or last
month of a presidency, I use the data from the second or second to last month of the pres-
idency for the missing month. I also include a variable measuring the time remaining in
the congressional term, Time Congress, measured in months. Finally, I include a variable
that measures whether the nomination opportunity is closed by reappointing the same nom-
inee after a nomination was returned by the Senate, Reappointment. I include this variable,
because often when a renomination is made, this type of nomination occurs very swiftly.
Time is incorporated into the model using a quadratic formulation for the duration
dependence. Duration is measured as the number of months that the vacancy has been
open. Duration and Duration2 are incorporated into the model to control for the time effect
on the hazard rate.
Results
The results for the models using both constraint and the distance between the president
and the Senate to measure the political environment are shown in Table 4.1.
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Constraint Elite Distance
(Intercept) -2.93∗ -2.94∗
(0.23) (0.23)
Circuit Court 0.21∗ 0.20∗
(0.08) (0.08)
Supreme Court 6.33∗ 6.31∗
(0.98) (0.98)
Constraint -0.16∗
(0.08)
Elite Distance -0.19∗
(0.09)
|P − SQ| -0.16 -0.14
(0.19) (0.19)
Time Congress 0.02∗ 0.02∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Time President -0.02∗ -0.02∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Approval -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Second Term 0.16 0.16
(0.08) (0.08)
New President 0.57∗ 0.57∗
(0.15) (0.15)
Senatorial Courtesy 0.12 0.12
(0.15) (0.15)
Lag Vacancies -0.02∗ -0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Reappointment 2.86∗ 2.86∗
(0.12) (0.12)
New Pres×Vac -0.04 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02)
Duration 0.21∗ 0.21∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Duration2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00)
N 16964 16964
AIC 10569 10569
BIC 10701 10569
logL -5268 -5268
Random Effects
Opportunity (Std. Dev.): 0.65 0.65
President (Std. Dev.): 0.29 0.30
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Table 4.1: These are the results from the discrete time duration models using
the blue slip senator for Senate ideology measured using both constraint and
elite distance. The dependent variable is measured as whether a nomination
opportunity ends in a given month.
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The first notable result from these models is that nominations to higher courts are filled
more swiftly. While the effect is statistically significant for both levels, the substantive effect
is much larger for vacancies to the Supreme Court than those to circuit courts. The hazard
rate increases from 0.097 to 0.117, an increase of 19.8% for appointments to circuit courts
over district courts when the president is unconstrained and from 0.084 to 0.101, an increase
of 20.4%, when the president is constrained.18 For the Supreme Court, the hazard rate
increases to 0.984 when the president is unconstrained, a 900.2% increase over district court
vacancies, and 0.981 when the president is constrained, a 1057.9% increase over district court
appointments.
A number of the hypotheses stemming from the theoretical model in Chapter 2 are
supported in these results. The results for inherited vacancies and the presence of a new
president are both consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model. As the number
of inherited vacancies in the geographic region increases, the hazard rate decreases, meaning
that a swift nomination is less likely. This gives support to the primary motivation for the
matching model: that vacancies should be considered together, not separately. The presence
of vacancies on courts for which the talent pool of potential judges is shared affects the
timing to nomination.19 The result for New President is also consistent with the results of
the model in Chapter 2. New presidents have higher hazard rates, meaning they fill more
vacancies in the first year, or when they first pay attention to vacancies, as the theoretical
model suggests.20
18These predictions are estimated using the results of the constraint model through stochastic simulations
(King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000) with all other variables set at their mean values.
19This result is robust to using court vacancies rather than geographic vacancies. The result is also
robust to substituting the inherited vacancies for a contemporaneous measure of vacancies on either the
court or in the geographic region. The result for geographic vacancies is also robust to including both court
and geographic vacancies. When including both, the coefficient for court vacancies is positive, but is not
statistically significant.
20Some might question whether that this has more to do with the fact that it is the beginning of a
presidential term rather than a new president effect, especially since the coefficient on time remaining in the
president’s term is negative. There are two things to note on this point. First, if instead of the latter half
of the first year of the Presidency, New President is measured as the full first year of the Presidency, this
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The political environment result is consistent with results from the model in Chapter 2
using the blue slip Senator’s ideology score. When the blue slip Senator, who is generally
viewed as a constraint on the president’s ability to select nominees to lower courts, con-
strains the president, or is located further from the president, ideologically, the hazard rate
decreases.21 For district courts, this leads to a decrease of around 14% in the hazard rate,
about 13% for circuit courts, and 0.2% for the Supreme Court.22 The positive results for the
political environment variables using other ideology scores suggest that other members of
the Senate do not constrain the president in the same way as the blue slip Senator. Only this
Senator constrains the president in a manner consistent with the theoretical model presented
in Chapter 2. Primo, Binder and Maltzman (2008) consider which pivots are controlling in
the judicial confirmation process, finding that some Senators are more pivotal than others.
The results from these empirical tests suggest that the same is true with respect to when the
president nominates judges. Future research should further examine the dynamics of how
different pivotal Senators affect time to nomination.
The result for the interaction between New President and Inherited Vacancies is not
consistent with the results of the model and shows the opposite effect of what the model
predicts. The theoretical model suggests that new presidents will have a smaller inherited
vacancy effect than continuing presidents. The negative coefficient on the interaction term,
however, suggests that new presidents have a larger negative effect, or a stronger negative
effect for inherited vacancies than continuing presidents. This result is not, however, statis-
coefficient is negative. Additionally, when the first half of the first year is included as a separate variable,
the effect for this variable is negative while the latter sixth month effect remains positive. Second, this is a
measure of the presidency as a whole, so for Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, this is only
the latter six months of the first year of their first term. As a result, this is not a second measure of a time
in term effect, but a pure measure of a new presidency effect.
21Using the court ideology scores without senior judges, this result is still negative, but falls just short of
statistical significance at the .05 level using a two-tailed test. It is, however, significant using a one-tailed
test. The result is also not statistically significant using a conditional logit approach to handle the duration
effect. The results are robust to any other parametrization for the time effect.
22These differences in the hazard rates are roughly equal using either the constraint variable or the elite
distance variable.
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tically significant. While this result is inconsistent with the predictions from the theoretical
model, as I noted previously, the model inherently assumes that the president is only con-
cerned with filling vacancies in the judiciary. Because the first year of a presidency is often
busy, when there are numerous vacancies to fill that have carried over from a president’s
predecessor, he delays filling the vacancies (which is consistent with the results of the theo-
retical model, since the model predicts a negative vacancy effect for both new and continuing
presidents). The substantive effects of these variables reveal the interplay between new pres-
idents and the inherited vacancy effect. For new presidents the vacancy effect is larger, and
varies at the different levels of the judiciary. For district court vacancies, the hazard rate
changes from 0.106, when Inherited Vacancies is one standard deviation below it mean, to
0.088, when the variable is one standard deviation above its mean, a 17.8% decrease, for
continuing presidents and from 0.174 to 0.104, a 40.3% decrease, for new presidents.23 A
similar pattern holds for circuit court appointments, with a change in the hazard rate from
0.128 to 0.106, a 17.5% decrease, for continuing presidents and a change from 0.206 to 0.125,
a 39.3% decrease, for new presidents. On the Supreme Court, the effect for the number
of vacancies is much smaller, and is nearly indistinguishable between continuing and new
presidents. For Supreme Court vacancies, the hazard rate changes from 0.985 for vacancies
one standard deviation below the mean to 0.982 for vacancies one standard deviation above
the mean, a 0.3% decrease, for continuing presidents, and from 0.991 to 0.984, and a 0.6%
decrease, for new presidents.24 Presidents on average still fill vacancies more quickly in the
last six months of their first year in office than the rest of their presidency, however. Again,
this effect varies for the level of the court and for the number of inherited vacancies. For
23The percentage change in the hazard rate is roughly similar when the president is constrained and
unconstrained. The hazard rates presented are for when the president is unconstrained. All other variables
are held at their means.
24Though substantively small, these differences are statistically significant. The hazard rate is already
exceptionally high for the Supreme Court, even in the face of vacancies more than one standard deviation
above the mean. The hazard rate is consistently above 0.98 for vacancies to the Supreme Court, regardless
of the size of the Inherited Vacancies variable.
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district courts, there is a 38.5% increase in the hazard rate (from 0.106 to 0.174) for new
presidents when the number of inherited vacancies is low, a 29% increase (0.097 to 0.138)
when Inherited Vacancies is at its mean, and no statistically significant difference between
continuing and new presidents for high vacancies.25 For circuit courts, there is a 37.6% in-
crease in the hazard rate (from 0.128 to 0.206) for new presidents for low vacancies, 28.7%
for mean vacancies (from 0.117 to 0.165), and no difference for high vacancies. Again for the
Supreme Court, the substantive differences are small, 0.5% increase (from 0.983 to 0.989)
for new presidents when there is a mean score for vacancies, 0.6% increase for low vacancies
(from 0.985 to 0.991), and no difference for high vacancies.
These results suggest an interesting normative implication about the persistence of va-
cancies in the judiciary. These persistent vacancies are an often criticized part of American
politics. Judges often complain about workloads and the Supreme Court Chief Justice rou-
tinely talks about the state of the justice system in the United States being hurt by the
persistence of vacancies in the judiciary in his annual report, such as the one from which
the quote at the beginning of this chapter was taken. The president and Senate often point
fingers at one another to place the blame for why vacancies persist. What this result seems
to indicate is that the presence of vacancies begets more vacancies. When a president is
faced with vacancies that were “inherited”, either because he has allowed vacancies to build
up within his own presidency, or because the vacancies have carried over from the president’s
predecessor, it takes him longer to fill the vacancies. The added vacancies add to the pres-
ident’s workload, thereby making it more difficult for him to find judges to fill each vacant
position.
The data do not confirm the distance between the president and the status quo effect
that the theoretical model predicts. The model predicts that when the president is further
removed from the status quo, he fills more vacancies, which translates to a swifter nomination
25Low vacancies refers to when the Inherited Vacancies variable is one standard deviation below its mean
and high vacancies refers to when the variable is one standard deviation above its mean.
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when examining duration. I find no evidence that this relationship exists. One explanation
for why I do not find evidence of this effect could be that the president is not attentive to
the expected location of court output, which is how I have measured the court ideologies.
Instead, the president might care more about the variance of the court’s decisions or some
other component of court output than the expected location. Alternatively, it could be a
matter of the measurement used for the judge’s ideologies. The Judicial Common Space
scores are fixed for the judge’s tenure in office and are determined based on the ideology
of the actors involved in the nomination and confirmation process. To the extent that the
ideologies of judges do not perfectly reflect the actors who appoint them, or do not remain
constant while on the bench, this error may make finding this distance effect more difficult
since presidents would have better information about the judges’ and courts’ ideological
positions.
Promotions
I turn now to the empirical test of hypotheses 6 and 7. The data for this test consist of
all nomination opportunities to the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court which end in
a nomination. The outcome variable is binary: 1 if the nominated judge served on a federal
court prior to the nomination and 0 otherwise. There are 461 nominations to the Courts of
Appeals or the Supreme Court from 1977 to 2008. Because the dependent variable is binary,
I estimate a hierarchical logistic regression model with random intercepts for each president.
The primary variables of interest are the level of court, Supreme Court, and the rela-
tionships between the Senate, president, and the courts to which the nominations are made:
Constraint and Elite Distance. The level of court is measured as a binary variable, it is
equal to 1 for nominations to the Supreme Court and 0 for nominations to the Courts of
Appeals. I use the same conceptualization of constraint that I use in discussing the results
of the model. Because previous literature has not looked at the factors that contribute to
the incidence of promotion, except for a couple of articles looking at qualities of judges that
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are promoted (Black and Owens, 2012; Epstein, Landes and Posner, 2013; Savchak et al.,
2006), there is no clear Senate ideology that should constrain the president’s promotion de-
cisions. Unlike the test for duration, where previous literature indicates the importance of
home-state Senators for this process, there is no similar indication of which Senators might
be pivotal for promotion decisions. As a result, I take an approach similar to Primo, Binder
and Maltzman (2008) and present the results of models using each measure of Senate ide-
ology to gauge which Senators are pivotal.26 For Constraint and Elite Distance, I use the
value for the month the nomination is made.
I also include some of the same control variables that I used in the last section. I include
the time remaining in the congressional session, Time Congress, and the time remaining in
the presidential term, Time President, both measured in months. I also include the measure
of the president’s approval rating, Approval. For these variables, I use the score for the
month that the nomination is made.27
I include a few additional control variables that were not in the duration model above. I
include a variable indicating the number of months that the position was vacant before it was
filled, Months Open, as well as a binary variable indicating whether the nomination is the
president’s first opportunity to fill the position, First Open. The first opportunity variable is
equal to 1 if the president has not previously nominated anyone to the position and 0 if the
president has appointed someone to the position previously and the nomination was returned
to the president or withdrawn. Because the promotion result from the theoretical model
indicates that the president promotes because current judges have higher qualifications and
will be more likely to be approved by the Senate, even if they are not ideologically preferential
26I do not include a measure for Senatorial Courtesy, because the value is always equal to the president’s
ideology for the Supreme Court by design and for the Courts of Appeals in practice.
27I do not include a measure of the president’s distance from the status quo, because there is no reason to
expect that this distance will affect whether a vacancy is filled through promotion. The president can likely
find both a new judge and a judge to promote who are roughly equidistant from his own ideology.
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to the Senate, I include a measure of the distance between the Senate and the court location,
|S-SQ|.
Results
The results of these models are in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Median Maj Party Jud Cmte Jud Cmte Chr Filibuster Blue Slip
Intercept -2.40∗ -1.13 -2.19 -0.86 -0.84 -0.14
(0.92) (0.70) (1.28) (0.70) (0.65) (0.70)
Semi-Constrained 1.37 0.73 1.49 0.29
(0.70) (0.38) (1.13) (0.52)
Fully-Constrained 1.69∗ 0.67∗ 1.71 0.66∗ -0.07 0.36
(0.71) (0.30) (1.13) (0.30) (0.30) (0.59)
|S-SQ| 1.80 1.28 0.49 0.36 1.17 -0.93
(1.03) (0.87) (0.89) (0.73) (0.81) (0.68)
Supreme Court 2.44∗ 2.31∗ 2.20∗ 2.38∗ 2.26∗ 2.31∗
(0.85) (0.80) (0.80) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81)
Months Open -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
First Open 0.45 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.32
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Approval 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Second Term -0.16 -0.11 -0.09 -0.21 -0.04 -0.04
(0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24)
Time Congress -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Time President 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 461 461 461 461 461 461
AIC 582.4 584.1 585.5 583.8 585.1 583.3
BIC 632.0 633.7 635.1 633.4 630.6 628.8
logL -279.2 -280.0 -280.7 -279.9 -281.6 -280.7
Random Effects
Intercept (Std. Dev.): 0.18 0.24 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.38
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Table 4.2: These are the results of the hierarchical logistic regression models
using constraint measured with each of 6 measures of Senate ideology. The
dependent variable measures whether the nominee served as a federal judge
prior to nomination. The columns correspond to the ideology for different
pivotal members of the Senate. From left to right the pivotal members are:
the median member, the median of the majority party, the judiciary committee
median, the judiciary committee chair, the filibuster pivot, and the blue slip
Senator.
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Median Maj Party Jud Cmte Jud Cmte Chr Filibuster Blue Slip
Intercept -2.52 -0.65 -1.22 -0.84 -2.12 -0.13
(0.73) (0.64) (0.74) (0.67) (1.26) (0.70)
|P-S| 4.59∗ 0.88 1.83 0.84∗ 2.22 0.40
(1.32) (0.47) (1.02) (0.39) (1.96) (0.70)
|S-SQ| 1.13 0.17 -0.10 0.21 1.01 -0.94
(0.95) (0.69) (0.87) (0.66) (0.80) (0.68)
Supreme Court 2.33∗ 2.28∗ 2.36∗ 2.31∗ 2.31∗ 2.31∗
(0.80) (0.80) (0.81) (0.80) (0.80) (0.81)
Months Open -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
First Open 0.38 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.41 0.32
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Approval -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Second Term -0.25 -0.08 -0.04 -0.17 -0.17 -0.04
(0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24)
Time Congress -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Time President 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 461 461 461 461 461 461
AIC 577.0 584.0 583.8 582.6 583.9 583.4
BIC 622.5 629.5 629.3 628.1 629.4 628.9
logL -277.5 -281.0 -280.9 -280.3 -281.0 -280.7
Random Effects
Intercept (Std. Dev.): 0.00 0.28 0.40 0.32 0.31 0.38
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Table 4.3: These are the results of the hierarchical logistic regression models
using elite distance measured with each of 6 measures of Senate ideology. The
dependent variable measures whether the nominee served as a federal judge
prior to nomination. The columns correspond to the ideology for different
pivotal members of the Senate. From left to right the pivotal members are:
the median member, the median of the majority party, the judiciary committee
median, the judiciary committee chair, the filibuster pivot, and the blue slip
Senator.
These results largely support the predictions from the theoretical model. First, pro-
motions to the Supreme Court are more likely than promotions to the Courts of Appeals.
This result is consistent with the results of the theoretical model, as well as general knowl-
edge about appointments. When the president is unconstrained, promotions to the Supreme
Court are 392.2% more likely than to circuit courts (from a predicted probability of promo-
tion of 0.107 for circuit court nominations to 0.577 for Supreme Court nominations). When
the president is semi-constrained, promotions are 158.2% more likely (from 0.317 to 0.840)
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to the Supreme Court and 119.6% (from 0.391 to 0.878) more likely when the president is
fully-constrained.28
Second, for the most part, when the president is further away from the Senate, or when he
is fully constrained by the Senate, he is more likely to promote. This result is consistent with
the expectations from the theoretical model. Because judges with previous experience are
considered better qualified, if the president chooses to promote within the judiciary, he likely
gains concessions from the Senate with regard to ideology. What is particularly interesting
from these results is the differences between the different Senate ideologies. The results for
the judiciary committee chair and the median of the Senate are statistically significant and
positive in both the constraint and the distance models,29 the results for the filibuster pivot,
the judiciary committee median, and the blue slip senator’s ideology are not significant in
either the constraint or distance models, and the ideology for the median of the majority
party is significant in the constraint model, but not the distance model.
The ideology results reveal an interesting underlying dynamic to judicial appointments.
Different pivotal players seem to matter for different parts of the appointment process. While
the blue slip senator plays a vital role in the appointment process, the presence of a blue slip
senator does not affect the likelihood that the president will fill a vacancy through promotion.
This is likely because the president has some leeway when it comes to appointments to higher
courts. There is no blue slip process for the Supreme Court, and for circuit courts, the blue
slip process relies on the senators in the state from which the judge is selected. While some
seats are associated with particular states, there is more flexibility on the president’s part
to potentially avoid a Senator who might submit a blue slip by selecting a judge from a
different state in the circuit (which has been built into the blue slip score). As a result,
the presence of a blue slip senator need not affect the type of judge chosen. Additionally,
28The substantive effects given are determined from the model using the median member’s ideology. All
other variables are set at their means.
29The constraint result is not robust to using the measure without senior judges. The distance result is
robust to this measure.
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while the filibuster pivot is a vital part of congressional action, there is no evidence that
the filibuster pivot matters for promotion decisions. This might suggest that the likelihood
of a filibuster does not differ for a promoted judge versus a new judge. This is consistent
with a wide range of congressional literature that suggests members of Congress behave
differently on procedural matters than they do on final passage votes (Ansolabehere, Snyder
and Stewart, 2001; Cox and Poole, 2002; Froman and Ripley, 1965; Rohde, 1991; Theriault,
2008; Turner and Schneier, 1970). While the increased qualifications make Senators more
likely to approve the nominee, it might not make them more likely to change the procedural
hurdles that stand in the way of confirmation.
These results are consistent with the president’s promotion decisions being made with
respect to getting the nomination to and passing a final confirmation vote. As the judiciary
committee chair, who can affect whether the nomination passes through the committee,
and the median Senator, who can affect the ability of the judge to pass the floor vote,
move farther from the president, a vacancy is more likely to be filled through promotion.
Constraint has a more pronounced substantive effect for circuit courts than the Supreme
Court. On the circuit courts, the probability of promotion increases from 0.107 when the
president is unconstrained to 0.391 when the president is fully-constrained, an increase of
265%.30 For the Supreme Court, the probability increases from 0.577 when unconstrained
to 0.878 when fully-constrained, an increase of 49%.
Discussion and Conclusion
In Chapter 2, I created a model that predicted the portfolio of judges who are appointed
to the United States Judiciary. This model was the first to consider the interdependence of
appointment decisions. In this chapter, I have focused on the predictions from the model
30These predictions are calculated using the model estimated with the median member’s ideology. All
other variables are set at their means.
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that pertain to delay in filling vacancies and promotions. I have empirically tested a number
of the predictions from the model that pertain to these two components of the appointment
process. I find that both of the model’s predictions about promotions are supported in the
empirical tests and three out of five of the predictions are supported about delay in filling
vacant positions.
Many of these results highlight, as with the results of the theoretical model, the interde-
pendence between vacancies in the judiciary. As the number of vacancies that the president
must fill increases, the speed with which he fills each vacancy decreases. A change in the
vacancy variable from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the
mean yields at least a 17% decrease in the hazard rate, or a 17% decrease in the probability
that a vacancy will be filled in a given month for district and circuit courts. The effect on
the Supreme Court is substantively small, though still statistically significant.
Future research should further explore some of the results from these empirical tests.
First, for delay in filling vacant positions, the results differ depending on which Senate ide-
ology is used. Further examination of the role of Senate constraint might give a better sense
of why the president delays his nomination decisions. Second, future research should look
more at why vacancies persist in the judiciary. The results from these empirical tests seem
to indicate that the more vacancies that the president “inherits” the longer he will take to
fill vacant positions. Finally, future research should further examine the incidence of pro-
motion within the judiciary. The results of these empirical tests indicate that the president
makes these decisions largely to ease the confirmation of the judge. This is consistent with
the results of the theoretical model: judges already in the judiciary have higher qualification
scores making the Senate pay a higher cost for rejecting them. The results from the empirical
models using various pivotal players in the Senate indicate that final confirmation is likely
the motivating consideration for promotion decisions. Future research should look more at
these decisions, and especially the interplay of different members in the Senate.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation project presents a new way to think about judicial selection. In this
dissertation, I have created a model of appointments to the United States Federal Judiciary
that considers appointment decisions to be interdependent rather than independent. In
Chapter 3, I modified this model to match four additional selection mechanisms to see how
the judges selected under different mechanisms differ. In the final chapter, I presented the
results of empirical tests of the model from Chapter 2’s testable predictions, which provide
support for the predictions from that model.
This interdependent approach allows me to better anticipate the president’s behavior with
respect to appointments at each level of the judiciary. The results from Chapter 2 suggest
that both the composition of the judiciary, the group of individuals who could be appointed,
and the elite actors’ ideologies help to explain the president’s appointment decisions. The
model confirms a number of results from previous literature, which has looked separately
at each stage of the process and at appointments to each level. This suggests that a single
process determines action at multiple stages of the appointment process.
Chapter 3 shows how the judges selected would differ under different selection mechanisms
that are utilized in the American states. From these models, it is clear that there are tradeoffs
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inherent in any mechanism. Some mechanisms lead to more qualified judges, while other
mechanisms yield more favorable vacancy rates. What this chapter shows is that the type
of mechanism dictates the judges that are selected.
The final chapter, Chapter 4, empirically tests Chapter 2’s testable predictions. The
results are, for the most part, consistent with the predictions from the model. This lends
some credibility to the results of the model that are untestable. Between the consistency of
the results with previous research and the confirmation of the model’s testable predictions
in this chapter, the approach that I have taken in this project seems justified.
This project approaches judicial selection in a new way, providing a number of new
and novel findings, as well as confirming results from previous research. Future research
examining judicial selection should consider the interdependency that is inherent in the
decisions that are being made in selecting judges.
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Chapter 6
Appendices
Appendix A: Model Specification
I programmed the model using Mathematica 8.0 Student Edition. In this technical ap-
pendix, I will describe the program and give a complete overview of the parameters involved
in the model
Choice Set
To begin, I create a talent pool of potential judges and the four district, two circuit,
and one supreme court. The model is simulated using talent pools of 500, 1000, and 2000
potential judges. For each potential judge and each judge on a court in the judiciary, certain
pieces of information are stored. I randomly assign each judge or potential judge ideology
and qualification scores. For each ideology score, I use a random number generator to assign
any real number in [-1,1]. For each qualification score, I randomly assign each judge a score
between 1 and 8 for the talent pool, 3-10 for the district court judges, 4-11 for circuit court
judges, and 5-12 for supreme court judges, measured in increments of .5. That individual
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score is then divided by 12 (the highest possible qualification score a judge can have). For
each potential judge, a geographic district is randomly selected from the four district courts.1
Payoff Functions
The payoff functions are programmed using the components described in the develop-
ment of the model. The weights assigned to each level are 3 for the supreme court, 2 for
circuit courts, and 1 for district courts. The weighted costs are the same for both accepting
unqualified judges and rejecting qualified judges and are .3, .2, and .1 for supreme, circuit,
and district court vacancies respectively. The weighted cost is multiplied by 0 if the judge’s
qualification score meets the threshold, or the inverse of the qualification score if it is below
the threshold, for appointment costs and 0 if the judge’s qualification score is below the
threshold, or the judge’s qualification score if the qualifications are above the threshold, for
rejection costs. The threshold levels for the appointment costs are: 2
12
for district court
vacancies, 4
12
for circuit court vacancies, and 5
12
for supreme court vacancies. The threshold
levels for the rejection costs are: 5
12
for district court vacancies, 7
12
for circuit court vacancies,
and 8
12
for supreme court vacancies. Each function has an input for each court ideology, the
judge’s qualifications, and the respective elite ideology.
Yearly Matching Process
I run the appointment process for 5000 years, saving the nominations from the latter 3000
simulations. At the start of the year, I evaluate whether it is a Senate and/or presidential
election year. The first election occurs in year one. When an election occurs, the president
and Senate ideologies are selected. In the first year, ideologies for the president and Senate
are randomly selected from any real number in [-1,1]. For each subsequent year, if it is not
an election year, the elite ideologies from the previous year carry over to the current year.
1Because each district is in a particular circuit, the circuit is also assigned this way.
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If it is a presidential election year, with probability .25, the president is reelected, and with
probability .75, he is replaced by a new president. If the president is reelected, the same
presidential ideology will carry over to the next four years. If the president is not reelected,
a new president is selected, and a new ideology randomly chosen. If it is a Senate election
year, with probability .5, the same party maintains control of the Senate. If this occurs,
the ideology of the Senate will move only slightly (to determine the new ideology of the
Senate, a random number is selected from [-.1,.1] and added to the current Senate score).
Alternatively, with probability .5, a new ideology is randomly chosen from [-1,1].
Next, vacancies occur at each level of the judiciary through a Poisson process. The
parameter for the rate of vacancies is equal to .05 times the number of judges on the court.
Once the number of judges who will leave is generated, the judges are randomly selected
from the court and removed.
The status quo values are calculated for each court using the rule that is associated with
the decision rule for the court. The judges that are between the president and the status quo
are compiled into a list for each court. All of the court lists are compiled into one master
list and sorted based on their distance from the president.
The algorithm starts. For each judge starting with the closest judge to the president,
the algorithm determines each court for which she is eligible and located between the new
president and the status quo. A judge is eligible for a court if the court is higher than the
court she currently serves on and she lives in the district or circuit in which the court is
located. The president’s payoff is calculated for assigning the judge to each eligible court.
To determine the new court location, the judge is added to the court and the court location
is calculated using the rule determined for the court’s decision rule. The new court location
as well as the location of the other courts, as determined by the ideology given the judges
remaining on the court, plus any judges that have already been selected for that court in
the matching process, minus judges who have been promoted from the court earlier in the
matching process, are run through the president’s payoff function. If the judge is already
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on a court, the judge is removed from the court they are currently on and both court scores
are calculated to enter the president’s payoff function. Any individual costs for that judge
for that position are also entered into the payoff function along with any costs the president
has already paid in the matching process. Next, the Senate’s payoff is calculated for both
confirming and rejecting the judge to each position.
If appointing the judge to at least one position improves the president’s payoff, the
Senate’s payoffs for accepting and rejecting the judge are compared. Starting with the
president’s most preferred position for the judge, the position that gives the president the
highest payoff, if the Senate has a higher payoff for accepting the nomination, the match is
made. If the Senate has a higher payoff for rejecting the judge, the payoffs are compared
for appointing the judge to the president’s next preferred position. This continues until
either the judge is selected to a position or has been considered for all positions. If the
judge is selected for a position, the number of vacancies on that court is reduced by 1. If
the judge is promoted from another court the number of vacancies on the court from which
she is promoted increases by 1. If the president does not want to appoint the judge to any
position, the president moves on to the next closest judge and the previous steps repeat. If
the Senate would reject any appointment, the cost for blocking the appointment is added to
the Senate’s continuing costs and the president moves on to the next closest judge and the
process repeats. The cost is equal to the maximum cost that the Senate would pay to reject
the judge. These steps are repeated until either all judges and potential judges have been
considered for all positions or all vacancies are filled.
At the end of the matching algorithm, the newly appointed judges are each placed on
their new court. The judge’s qualification scores are increased commensurate with the court
on which they are placed. If the judge is placed on a district court, her score increases 2
12
points, if she is placed on a circuit court, her score increases 3
12
if she is a new judge and
1
12
if she was promoted from a district court, and if she is placed on the supreme court, her
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score increases 4
12
if she is a new judge, 2
12
if she was a district court judge, and 1
12
if she was
a circuit court judge.
At the end of each iteration of the model, some judges leave the talent pool and are
replaced with new talent. When the new judges enter, their ideologies are centered around
the president’s ideal point: Their ideologies are drawn from a normal distribution with a
mean equal to the president’s ideology and a standard deviation of .15. The ideology scores
are truncated in [-1,1]. Both the number of judges leaving and the number entering are
drawn from a Poisson distribution. The rate parameter for the judges leaving is larger than
the rate parameter for the replenishing set of judges. The number that reenter is truncated
to ensure that the talent pool does decrease below nine-tenths its original size.
Appendix B: Robustness
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Med Med Maj Pty Fil Sen Ctsy Jud Cmte Jud Cmte Chr
(Intercept) -3.43∗ -2.98∗ -3.47∗ -2.99∗ -3.18∗ -3.00∗
(0.27) (0.24) (0.27) (0.23) (0.25) (0.24)
Circuit Court 0.26∗ 0.26 0.26∗ 0.26∗ 0.26∗ 0.26∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Supreme Court 6.32∗ 6.39∗ 6.36∗ 6.36∗ 6.37∗ 6.36∗
(0.98) (0.98) (0.97) (0.97) (0.98) (0.97)
Constrained 0.35∗ 0.14 0.37∗ 0.15 0.17 0.06
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.22) (0.09) (0.08)
|P − SQ| 0.49 -0.16 0.35 -0.18 0.08 -0.19
(0.27) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19)
Time Congress 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time President -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Approval -0.01∗ -0.01∗ -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Second Term 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.12
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
New President 0.57∗ 0.57∗ 0.58∗ 0.58∗ 0.57∗ 0.56∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Inherit Vacancies -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Reappointment 2.85∗ 2.85∗ 2.85∗ 2.85∗ 2.85∗ 2.85∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
New Pres×Vac -0.04 -0.04 -0.04∗ -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Duration 0.21∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 16964 16964 16964 16964 16964 16964
AIC 10561 10571 10561 10573 10570 10573
BIC 10693 10702 10693 10705 10702 10705
logL -5263 -5268 -5264 -5270 -5268 -5270
Random Effects
Opportunity (Std. Dev.): 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
President (Std. Dev.): 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Table 6.1: These are the results of the discrete time duration models using
constraint measured with 6 different pivotal Senate ideologies. The dependent
variable is measured as whether a nomination opportunity ends in a given
month. The columns correspond to the ideology for different pivotal members
of the Senate. From left to right the pivotal members are: the median mem-
ber, the median of the majority party, the filibuster pivot, senatorial courtesy
Senators, the judiciary committee median, and the judiciary committee chair.
138
Med Med Maj Pty Fil Sen Ctsy Jud Cmte Jud Cmte Chr
(Intercept) -3.72∗ -3.00∗ -4.43∗ -2.98∗ -3.03∗ -3.01∗
(0.32) (0.24) (0.44) (0.23) (0.27) (0.24)
Circuit Court 0.26∗ 0.26∗ 0.25∗ 0.30∗ 0.26∗ 0.26∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Supreme Court 6.46∗ 6.40∗ 6.33∗ 6.44∗ 6.37∗ 6.34∗
(0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.97) (0.97)
Elite Distance 1.83∗ 0.30∗ 2.46∗ 0.23 0.15 0.12
(0.50) (0.14) (0.63) (0.23) (0.32) (0.12)
|P − SQ| -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.27 -0.22 -0.21
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Time Congress 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.01∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time President -0.01∗ -0.02∗ -0.01∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Approval -0.01∗ -0.01∗ -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Second Term 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.14 0.12
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
New President 0.56∗ 0.56∗ 0.56∗ 0.58∗ 0.57∗ 0.56∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Inherit Vacancies -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Reappointment 2.85∗ 2.84∗ 2.84∗ 2.85∗ 2.85∗ 2.85∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
New Pres×Vac -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04∗ -0.04 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Duration 0.21∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗ 0.21∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration2 -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗ -0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 16964 16964 16964 16964 16964 16964
AIC 10561 10570 10558 10573 10574 10573
BIC 10692 10701 10690 10704 10705 10704
logL -5263 -5268 -5262 -5269 -5270 -5269
Random Effects
Opportunity (Std. Dev.): 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
President (Std. Dev.): 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.30
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Table 6.2: These are the results of the discrete time duration models using
elite distance measured with 6 different pivotal Senate ideologies. The depen-
dent variable is measured as whether a nomination opportunity ends in a given
month. The columns correspond to the ideology for different pivotal members
of the Senate. From left to right the pivotal members are: the median mem-
ber, the median of the majority party, the filibuster pivot, senatorial courtesy
Senators, the judiciary committee median, and the judiciary committee chair.
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